A group of opponents of the Tajik government in Europe said that the authorities have increased pressure on their relatives inside the country for three days.

The reason, according to them, was that “the president of the Republic of Tajikistan is likely to visit one of the European countries, and the representatives of the opposition should not hold demonstrations, raise slogans, and throw eggs against him.”

Tajik authorities have not yet announced the president’s visit abroad. Our efforts to get an official comment have so far been unsuccessful. The travel time is also not exact.

“The authorities demand the parents and other relatives of the Tajik opposition to force their children not to participate in any demonstrations or gatherings during Emomali Rahmon’s visit,” the statement of Paimon Milli, a coalition of four opposition organizations, said.

No official comment is available.

Officials of the National Alliance said on March 19 that such a threat has so far reached the relatives of Sharofiddin Gadoev, Salim Sultanzoda, Shohrajab Shohimi, Abdushukur Mannonov and other activists.

Sharofiddin Gadoev said that, in fact, his mother was called to the Department of Internal Affairs of Farkhor district two days ago. “They said there, tell your son not to protest against the president in Europe,” he said.

A similar situation happened on March 18 to the relatives of Shohrajab Shohimi, one of the representatives of the opposition, in the city of Panjakent. Shahimi says, “they even sent me a recording of my mother’s voice. In it, my mother scolded me and begged me not to join any group, not to protest.”

We also spoke with relatives of some of the opposition inside Tajikistan. They confirmed such conversations, but asked us not to publish their names and words in order not to cause difficulties in their work and life.

Meanwhile, representatives of the opposition in Europe claim that the authorities registered the house, car, land and other assets of their parents and “received a letter that if their children take part in demonstrations against Emomali Rahmon, they will confiscate everything.”

Mahmadzarif Saidov, a member of the Islamic Renaissance Banned Party in Tajikistan, says that on March 19, the authorities told his son to take the documents of the house to the security office of Dushanbe.

“Before that, the authorities took my parents, brother and eighteen-year-old son to the security office of Rudaki district and took a promise and a letter. My son asked me to promise in a video that I will not participate in the protests during the president’s visit. I did this in order not to put pressure on my parents. Saidov added.

In a statement on March 19, the National Alliance called the behavior of the Tajik authorities a “crime against humanity” and asked the government to “stop taking hostages of relatives and friends of political opponents.”

The President of the Republic of Tajikistan was in Germany in October 2023, when the opposition gathered against him, raised slogans and threw eggs at his car. This situation provoked the anger of the authorities and the relatives of some of the opponents were arrested and some were completely deprived of the use of electricity.

Human Rights Watch said in a report at that time that about 50 relatives of Berlin protesters were arrested in Tajikistan and some were released only after interrogation.

Source: Ozodi

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Tajikistan’s existential project to build the colossal 335-meter-high Roghun hydropower dam is proceeding apace, but costs are spiraling, and to a level that is making it hard to see where the government is going to find the funds needed to finish the work.

To complicate matters for Dushanbe, this is happening against the backdrop of calls from environmental watchdogs for international development lenders to pause the allocation of any future funds to Tajikistan pending a fresh assessment of the project.

The extent of the budget overshoot is striking.

In a press conference on February 16, Finance Minister Faiziddin Kahhorzoda revealed that the government spent 5.2 billion somoni ($475 million) on construction work at Roghun in 2023. That was 2.7 billion somoni more than had been planned, he said.

The projected government spend for this year, meanwhile, is 5 billion somoni. It is projected that 2.2 billion somoni can be solicited from foreign-based parties, Kahhorzoda said.

When work on Roghun, a project that was in its origins the brainchild of Soviet engineers, resumed in earnest in 2008, the estimate for the overall cost stood at $3 billion.

This climbed upward through the years.

In 2016, officials threw around the figure of $3.9 billion. In mid-2022, the Energy Ministry announced $5 billion would be needed for full project implementation. 

On February 1, Energy Minister Daler Juma offered a new forecast: $6.2 billion. That is high, although admittedly quite a bit short of the $8 billion prognostication he volunteered in an interview to Reuters news agency in June 2022. 

While the budget balloons, the timetable is sliding.

Once completed, Roghun will be fitted with six 600 megawatt turbines, amounting to a total installed capacity of 3,600 megawatts. As Milan-based WeBuild (formerly Salini Impregilo), which has been contracted to implement the project, has claimed on its website, that is “the equivalent of three nuclear power plants.”

The first generating units were put into operation in November 2018 and September 2019 to much clamor, but there has been limited progress since then. 

State media accentuates the upside. It cites energy officials as saying that while insufficient water pressure is causing delays, the generating units in place have to date produced around 7 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity. They furthermore value that volume of electricity at 1.5 billion somoni ($137 million).

Current annual electricity production in Tajikistan, much of which is accounted for by the Soviet-vintage Nurek hydropower plant, is around 17 billion kilowatt-hours.

Putting this together, it implies that Roghun has, since the first generating unit began working, likely contributed to well under one-tenth of Tajikistan’s electricity output. 

In 2019, managers of the Roghun hydroelectric plant reportedly predicted — possibly speaking in the spirit of hope rather than pragmatism — that a third generating unit would be installed within another two years. All six units were to be operational by 2026, according to that timetable. 

That was before COVID-19, however. The pandemic caused a major slowdown on work at Roghun along with much other economic activity in the country. 

Another deadline is now in place.

“We intend to put the third unit of the Roghun hydroelectric power station into operation in 2025,” President Emomali Rahmon said in an address to the nation in December.

He noted in that speech that the project is employing 15,000 laborers and technicians.

When Rahmon speaks of Roghun in his speeches, he couches the project in talk of the “bright future” awaiting the country and that it should serve as a “source of pride” for every Tajik citizen.

A more sober reality is that Roghun is part of the race against time to keep the country’s economy afloat.

Despite the additional productive capacity added by Roghun, the population still has to endure annual rationing of electricity.

When the temperature sinks below a certain level, output from the Nurek hydropower plant grinds to a near-halt. Under the annually imposed economy regime due to end in March, as is customary, households outside the country’s largest urban centers endure blackouts from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m and then from 10 p.m. to 5 a.m.

Meanwhile, the rate of population growth means that demand for electricity will continue surging. 

The World Bank in 2022 estimated that Tajikistan had the “youngest and fastest growing population in the Europe and Central Asia region.”

“Children under six years old comprise 17 percent of Tajikistan’s population, while roughly one of every three people is under 15 years of age,” the bank said at the time.

State statisticians have said that the current population of Tajikistan is just a whisker over 10.1 million. Fresh figures from last week, based on birth and death data, showed a population increase of 200,000 in 2023. That is a 2 percent rise.

Getting a clear and reliable idea of how much has been spent on Roghun over the past 16 years is tricky. Juma, the Energy Minister, threw out the figure of $3 billion in 2022. 

Dushanbe-based news outlet Asia-Plus cracked some numbers to come up with an updated estimate earlier this month and arrived at around 40 billion somoni, or $4 billion.

Considering current projections, which Juma says were calculated with the assistance of international consultants, that leaves $2.2 billion to go.

Tajikistan makes no secret of the fact that it is hoping for white knight investors to swoop in and provide the cash needed to get it over the line. 

But its efforts to get foreign funding so far have exposed it to considerable debt-servicing expenditure. 

In September 2017, the National Bank issued $500 million worth of eurobonds on the international market. That venture means Tajikistan is on the hook for around $850 million to be paid to investors by 2027.

Important chunks are arriving from here and there, though.

In December, the state-backed Saudi Fund for Development announced it was under a development loan agreement with Tajikistan contributing $100 million to fund the Roghun project.

A few months earlier, in May, China-dominated development lender Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank had reportedly — according to President Rahmon’s office — pledged to extend a soft $500 million loan to Dushanbe for the same purpose. Talk on this particular commitment has gone a little quiet since then.

Back in 2022, a representative for the European Union’s investment arm, the European Investment Bank, told Reuters that it was exploring becoming “the largest investor” in Roghun. That conversation too has withered for reasons unreported.

Environmental concerns are another factor.

Last month, a coalition of nongovernmental groups — Rivers without Boundaries, the NGO Forum on Asian Development Banks and the Bankwatch Network — issued a collective appeal to development banks to demand public discussions on an updated environmental assessment of Roghun before parting with any funds. The World Bank-backed environmental impact assessment conducted in 2014 is now woefully out of date, the coalition argued in its statement.

“Over the last 10 years we accumulated new knowledge about the dynamics of climate change, new factors of impact on the hydrological regime of the Vakhsh River and the entire Amu Darya basin,” Evgeny Simonov, international coordinator for Rivers without Boundaries, was cited as saying. “Even the most superficial analysis shows that potential transboundary impacts of the [Roghun] hydropower plant are enormous, and their consideration in the new environmental assessment … is practically non-existent.”

Source

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Infighting over the succession and growing frustration in the regions could shatter the stability that the Tajik president has been building for so many years.

Next year will mark thirty years of Emomali Rahmon’s presidency in Tajikistan, now the only country in Central Asia that has not seen a change of leadership since the early 1990s. Unsurprisingly, there have been rumors of an imminent transition of power for a decade.

The name of the successor is no secret: it’s Rahmon’s son, thirty-six-year-old Rustam Emomali. But there is no consensus within the president’s large family over the succession. Some of the president’s other children have their own ambitions to run the country, which could upset plans for the transition.

President Rahmon is seventy-one years old, and has reportedly suffered numerous health issues. Arrangements for the transition have long been in place, but events keep getting in the way of its implementation: first the pandemic and its economic fallout, and then the street protests in neighboring Kazakhstan in January 2022, which frightened the Tajik leader and persuaded him it was not a good time to step down. Even Turkmenistan has seen a power transition in recent years. Now Tajikistan is expected to implement its own in 2024.

Rustam has already headed a number of government agencies. Since 2017, he has been mayor of Dushanbe: a post he has combined since 2020 with that of speaker of the upper house of parliament, to whom power would automatically pass if the current president were to step down early.

His supporters argue that as the capital’s mayor, he has improved the city, supported youth initiatives, and started to form his own team of young technocrats. Some are counting on him to carry out at least limited reforms once he is in power, such as those seen in neighboring Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

Not everyone believes Rustam is ready to take over, however. The future president is an unknown quantity for most Tajiks. All of his public appearances are prerecorded and accompanied by information read out by the broadcaster, meaning that people have not even heard him speak. His nickname on social media is “the great mute.”

More worryingly, the heir apparent has reportedly shot and wounded two people: his own uncle in 2008, and—just last year—the head of the State Committee for National Security, Saimumin Yatimov, supposedly for refusing to carry out orders.

There are those within the presidential family who do not want to see Rustam succeed his father because they fear losing prestigious posts in government and business. They are indignant that there are no relatives within the team he is building. The current president cannot possibly keep everyone happy, and this could threaten the transition, as ambitious clan members prepare to battle it out for the top job in order to retain their privileges.

Rahmon has seven daughters and two sons. The most ambitious of them is generally considered to be the second daughter Ozoda, who has headed up the presidential administration since 2016. She is very experienced, works well with her staff, and has the trust of the security services. Unsurprisingly, given the alleged shooting incident, there is no love lost between Rustam and the country’s main security official Yatimov, who has reportedly been paving the way for Ozoda’s candidacy. In addition, her husband Jamoliddin Nuraliev is also considered a very influential figure, having been deputy chair of the country’s central bank for over seven years.

Another contender for the presidency could be Rahmon’s fifth daughter, Ruhshona, a seasoned diplomat who is well versed in Tajikistan’s political affairs. Her husband is the influential oligarch Shamsullo Sohibov, who made his fortune thanks to his family connection to the president. Together with his brothers, he controls entire sectors of the economy, including transport, media, and banking. Change at the top could deprive the Sohibov clan of both influence and money, so Ruhshona and her husband may well throw their hats into the ring.

They might get the backing of Rahmon’s other children, who also control various sectors of the economy, including air travel (the third daughter, Tahmina) and pharmacies (the fourth daughter, Parvina). There are also plenty of Rahmon’s more distant relatives who owe their fortunes to the president and fear losing their positions under his successor.

Rahmon has relied on the loyalty of various relatives to ensure the stable functioning of his regime. But overly vociferous squabbles within the family could destabilize the situation, and for precisely this reason, Rahmon has tried to temper their ambition. Ruhshona, for example, was sent to the UK as Tajik ambassador to stop her from interfering in the plans for the transition. Her oligarch husband went with her.

Nor is the heir apparent himself outside the fray. There is evidence that Rustam was involved in leaking information to the media about his sister Ozoda’s alleged affair with her driver: something that, in patriarchal Tajikistan, caused serious damage to her reputation. There are also rumors that Ozoda’s main ally Yatimov will be retired from his post as head of the security services and replaced with a close friend of Rustam, Shohruh Saidov.

Right now, international circumstances are conducive to a swift transition. Tajikistan’s relations with its trickiest neighbors, Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan, are improving. While the Taliban has yet to be recognized as the legitimate Afghan government by Dushanbe, both sides agreed to strengthen economic ties during the first visit to Tajikistan by a delegation from the radical Islamist movement in March this year. Meanwhile, the Tajik government has pledged to resolve the border dispute with Kyrgyzstan—an issue that has led to several armed clashes in the last three years—by spring 2024. Rahmon is clearly trying to hand over a stable country to his son.

The situation at home, however, is more complicated. There is also considerable opposition to Rustam’s candidacy among the regional elites, who have long supported Rahmon in exchange for access to state resources, and are now seeing many of the most lucrative cash flows appropriated by the presidential family. A transition of power could be an opportune moment to express their displeasure.

Events in Gorno-Badakhshan in spring 2022 were a stark warning of the dangers of that displeasure. After the civil war that ravaged the country in the early 1990s, many of its field commanders settled in the region. Over time, they became informal leaders of the local communities, helping to solve problems that the central government was ignoring, sometimes strong-arming local officials into making the required decision. Rahmon ordered several security operations to rid Gorno-Badakhshan of this dual power system, only for it to reemerge further down the line.

Last spring, protests erupted there after a local man was killed by law enforcement officers. The unrest lasted for several months until Rahmon crushed it by force. Many of the activists were killed or imprisoned, while others fled the country, and the region was brought back under Dushanbe’s control. But the anger simmering in the region could boil over again at the first sign of conflict.

For now, the other regions remain loyal to the regime, but that could change after the power transition if the local elites feel they are not getting sufficient state resources.

By directing all the streams of income and control of the country to his own relatives, Rahmon has painted himself into a corner. Infighting over the succession and growing frustration in the regions could shatter the stability that the president has been building for so many years. Power transitions rarely go to plan in Central Asia, and Tajikistan may be no exception.

Source

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Up-and-down relations between Iran and Tajikistan in the past decade shot up again after Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s official visit to Dushanbe on November 8-9, his second trip to the Tajik capital in 18 months.

Raisi’s visit to Tajikistan was symbolically important amid a rapprochement between the countries that overshadowed the relatively standard batch of bilateral agreements that were signed.

During the trip, Raisi and his Tajik counterpart, Emomali Rahmon, announced a historic visa-free travel agreement for their citizens and deals in trade, transportation, and culture, among others.

High-ranking visits have become a regular occurrence between the two countries in the past year — with Iranian Defense Minister Reza Qaraei Ashtiani visiting Tajikistan in October and chief prosecutor Mohammad Jaafar Montazeri leading a judiciary delegation to Dushanbe in June.

But relations haven’t always been rosy between the two Persian-speaking countries, which share close linguistic, cultural, and historical ties as well as a common key ally, Russia.

Ties were marred in the past decade by tensions that saw the severing of investment and export deals, the suspension of direct flights, and the closure of Iranian charity and culture centers in Tajikistan.

Iran angered Tajikistan in 2015 by inviting the head of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) to a conference just months after the party was very dubiously banned and branded a terrorist group by Dushanbe.

Enraging Dushanbe further, IRPT leader Muhiddin Kabiri was photographed being greeted by Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei at the event.

The relationship plunged to a new low in 2017 when Tajik state television — a government mouthpiece — accused Iran of financing and ordering political assassinations in Tajikistan after a string of prominent public figures, including politicians and scholars, were killed between 1997 and 2004.

In response, Iran accused Tajikistan of making baseless, blatant lies.

On Again, Off Again

Amid the tensions, Rahmon didn’t attend President Hasan Rohani’s second-term swearing-in ceremony in 2017. But all seemed forgotten when Dushanbe and Tehran started mending ties and Rohani visited Dushanbe in June 2019.

In September 2020, Tajik state TV aired another controversial documentary accusing Iran of financing militant activity in Tajikistan.

Tehran called the claim a “baseless allegation” and warned Dushanbe about “the consequences of behavior” that breaches “the rules of friendly relations.”

The documentary came as the Tajik Supreme Court reportedly jailed some 50 Tajiks — former graduates of Iranian universities — on charges of treason and religious extremism in closed-door trials.

Because the Tajik state media and the judiciary reflect precise government positions on issues, Dushanbe’s motives behind delivering a new blow to its ties with Iran are unclear.

What Does The Future Hold?

Rahmon also failed to attend Raisi’s inauguration ceremony in August 2021, citing a prior engagement. But the two presidents did meet the following month, when Raisi chose Tajikistan as the destination for his first foreign trip as president, coupling it with attendance at a key regional security summit.

Bilateral ties have, since then, increasingly strengthened.

In early 2022, Dushanbe and Tehran announced plans to increase bilateral trade to $500 million in future from just $121 million in 2021. And Rahmon went to Tehran in May 2022 — his first trip to Tehran in nine years, as relations were rekindled.

Ahmet Furkan Ozyakar, a Turkish-based expert on regional politics, said Iran’s “look-toward-the-east policy under President Raisi is…a noteworthy determinant in advancing relations with Dushanbe” amid Iran’s severe economic problems due to Western sanctions over Tehran’s controversial nuclear program.

“In the upcoming months we expect more official meetings between Dushanbe and Tehran at the ministerial level as part of this rapprochement in joint military and security agreements, along with increasing trade capacities,” Ozyakar, a lecturer on international relations at Ataturk University, told RFE/RL.

But given the recent history of the ups and downs between Iran and Tajikistan, some analysts are not as optimistic.

Touraj Atabaki, a prominent Middle East and Central Asia expert, doesn’t rule out the possibility of new “problems” arising in the foreseeable future. Atabaki, professor emeritus at Leiden University, says any major political changes within one of these two countries or international developments could affect relations between Dushanbe and sanctions-hit Iran.

“Tajikistan’s approach to international affairs is different from Iran’s approach on that matter. Challenges in the world arena might either bring them closer or break them apart — challenges like Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine or the current [Israel-Hamas] war, which threatens to spread to the wider West Asia region,” Atabaki told RFE/RL.

Source

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Eight United Nations experts are awaiting a response from Tajik authorities to a letter expressing concern about the fate of convicted journalists and civil activists. UN experts and special rapporteurs in their letter demanded an explanation from Dushanbe regarding reports of gross violations of the rights of nine convicted journalists and bloggers, as well as civil activists. The letter dated 12 May 2023, is published here. UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Mary Lawlor has visited Tajikistan earlier to address the human rights violations in the country.

In their appeal, which UN experts sent to Dushanbe in May of this year, they provided details of the detention and imprisonment, as well as information about the conditions of detention in correctional institutions for journalists and bloggers Daleri Imomali, Abdullo Gurbati, Zavkibeki Saidamini, Abdusattor Pirmuhammadzoda, Khushruz Jumaev, human rights activists Abdulmajid Rizoev, Manuchehra Kholiknazarov, Faromuz Irgashev and civil activist Ulfatonim Mamadshoeva.

The letter to Tajikistan authorities was signed by the UN Special Rapporteur of human rights defenders, Mary Lawlor, and the UN Special Rapporteur on torture, Alice Gill Edwards, cites cases of torture and ill-treatment of detainees. UN experts also criticized the Tajik authorities for imprisoning detained journalists and bloggers on trumped-up charges of extremism and collaboration with banned organizations.

Last year, authorities sentenced them to terms ranging from 7 years to life in prison. Supporters of those convicted and international human rights organizations believe that the arrests and detention of journalists and civil activists were politically motivated. UN experts noted in a 20-page letter that from arrest to trial, the rights of detained journalists and activists were grossly violated.

One of the convicts, Daler Emomali, was accused of illegal entrepreneurship, dissemination of knowingly false information and participation in an extremist association, and was sentenced to 10 years in prison. However, human rights activists believe that the authorities took revenge on him for his critical videos.

The letter expresses concern about the fate of journalist and civil activist Ulfatonim Mamadshoeva, whom the authors call a representative of the “Pamir minority.” UN experts expressed regret that the Tajik authorities never responded to their previous letters regarding the fate of Mamadshoeva.

66-year-old Ulfathonim Mamadshoeva was sentenced to 21 years in prison in early December 2022 . The Tajik authorities accused Ulfathonim Mamadshoeva of organizing mass riots in the Rushan district and the city of Khorog in May 2022. Supporters of Mamadshoeva consider the criminal case to be fabricated.

The letter, signed, in particular, by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Mary Lawlor, and the UN Special Rapporteur on torture, Alice Gill Edwards, cites cases of torture and ill-treatment of detainees. The authors write that the arbitrary arrests of some of those convicted are contrary to the laws of Tajikistan and international law. UN experts also criticized the Tajik authorities for imprisoning detained journalists and bloggers on trumped-up charges of extremism and collaboration with banned organizations. The actions of the Tajik authorities are a stern warning to other human rights defenders: criticism will be severely punished.

The letter was officially sent to the government of Tajikistan in May. The authorities had to respond to this message within 60 days. However, apparently, there was no response from Dushanbe: the UN, as a rule, publishes responses to its appeals on its official website.

In recent years, the government of Tajikistan has been criticized by the UN, Western countries and international human rights organizations for regular violations of human rights in the country.

Source : Radio Free Europe

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Geneva, London (29/7 – 50)

Mary Lawlor, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, condemned the arrest and imprisonment of journalists, bloggers and civil society activists in Tajikistan, and questioned the credibility of the evidence presented in court against them.

Lawlor was on a two-week official visit to Tajikistan last December. The report prepared by her and members of the delegation on the results of this visit was published in May of this year, but only now became available to the public.

The authorities of Tajikistan will have to prepare an official response to the document, which will be submitted to the UN Human Rights Council in March 2024.

The report contains details of the detention and imprisonment, as well as information on the conditions of detention in correctional institutions of journalists and bloggers Daleri Imomali, Abdullo Gurbati, Zavkibeki Saidamini, Abdusattor Pirmuhammadzoda, Ulfathonim Mamadshoeva, human rights activists and civil activists Abdulmajid Rizoev, Manuchekhr Kholiqnazarov, Faromuz Irgashev and Khushruz Dzhumaev. Authorities last year sentenced them to various terms ranging from 7 years to life imprisonment. Supporters of the convicts and international human rights organizations believe that the arrests and imprisonment of journalists and civil activists were politically motivated.

“A feature of the trials is that they were all held behind closed doors, the lawyers of the defendants were forbidden to communicate with the media,” the report says.

The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders and members of the delegation found in criminal cases many facts of human rights violations, non-compliance with the laws of Tajikistan and international obligations of Tajikistan. The report, in particular, notes that some of the defendants were subjected to torture and ill-treatment, some were denied emergency medical care.

The criminal cases brought against civil society activists, human rights activists and journalists, the authors of the report regard as a very bad example of the suppression of freedom of speech and as an attempt to silence critical voices in Tajikistan.

The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders demands from the government of Tajikistan to provide the true and legal reasons for the arrest and sentence of each of the convicted human rights defenders and civil activists, as well as to explain why the authorities are hiding the details of these high-profile criminal cases from the public, and to what extent this is appropriate international obligations taken on by Tajikistan.

The UN Special Rapporteur is waiting for Dushanbe’s answer to the questions: Where were Saidamini, Pirmuhammadzoda and Dzhumaev from the moment of detention until the official announcement of their arrest, has an investigation been launched into the use of torture against Daleri Imomali, Abdusattor Pirmuhammadzoda and Ulfathonim Mamadshoeva?

The report also contains a requirement to provide a detailed report on the state of health of each of the convicted activists, journalists and bloggers.

The report says that the convicted Mamadshoeva and Kholiknazarov filed a complaint with the collegium of the Supreme Court of Tajikistan. Consideration of their complaints began on 14 March.

The authors of the report, recalling the international obligations of Tajikistan, note their gross violation or ignorance in the consideration of criminal cases of journalists, bloggers and civil activists.

The Tajik authorities have not yet reacted to the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, but earlier the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor General’s Office of Tajikistan stated that all criminal cases against civil activists, journalists and bloggers were considered objectively and impartially

Source

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The Ministry of Internal Affairs for Dushanbe reported that over the past year, as part of the Knife special operation in the capital, 1,120 cold weapons were seized from teenagers and young people, including 766 knives, 335 brass knuckles, 14 bits, 4 stun guns and one axe.

With regard to all the detainees, legal measures of influence have already been taken by the relevant decisions of the courts.

Operation “Knife” in Dushanbe has been carried out since 2018 “in order to prevent the commission of crimes with the use of bladed weapons and the carrying of objects used as weapons.”

The metropolitan police notes that “it is thanks to these measures that the level of crime among adolescents and young people, especially crimes committed with cold weapons, has decreased.”

“In 2022, the crime rate among teenagers in Dushanbe decreased by 14.4%, and cases of hooliganism by 46.1%. Last year, the crime rate among youth also decreased by 17.7% in the capital of Tajikistan,” the Ministry of Internal Affairs reports.

The department notes that this operation will continue this year.

Source: asiaplustj

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