A group of opponents of the Tajik government in Europe said that the authorities have increased pressure on their relatives inside the country for three days.

The reason, according to them, was that “the president of the Republic of Tajikistan is likely to visit one of the European countries, and the representatives of the opposition should not hold demonstrations, raise slogans, and throw eggs against him.”

Tajik authorities have not yet announced the president’s visit abroad. Our efforts to get an official comment have so far been unsuccessful. The travel time is also not exact.

“The authorities demand the parents and other relatives of the Tajik opposition to force their children not to participate in any demonstrations or gatherings during Emomali Rahmon’s visit,” the statement of Paimon Milli, a coalition of four opposition organizations, said.

No official comment is available.

Officials of the National Alliance said on March 19 that such a threat has so far reached the relatives of Sharofiddin Gadoev, Salim Sultanzoda, Shohrajab Shohimi, Abdushukur Mannonov and other activists.

Sharofiddin Gadoev said that, in fact, his mother was called to the Department of Internal Affairs of Farkhor district two days ago. “They said there, tell your son not to protest against the president in Europe,” he said.

A similar situation happened on March 18 to the relatives of Shohrajab Shohimi, one of the representatives of the opposition, in the city of Panjakent. Shahimi says, “they even sent me a recording of my mother’s voice. In it, my mother scolded me and begged me not to join any group, not to protest.”

We also spoke with relatives of some of the opposition inside Tajikistan. They confirmed such conversations, but asked us not to publish their names and words in order not to cause difficulties in their work and life.

Meanwhile, representatives of the opposition in Europe claim that the authorities registered the house, car, land and other assets of their parents and “received a letter that if their children take part in demonstrations against Emomali Rahmon, they will confiscate everything.”

Mahmadzarif Saidov, a member of the Islamic Renaissance Banned Party in Tajikistan, says that on March 19, the authorities told his son to take the documents of the house to the security office of Dushanbe.

“Before that, the authorities took my parents, brother and eighteen-year-old son to the security office of Rudaki district and took a promise and a letter. My son asked me to promise in a video that I will not participate in the protests during the president’s visit. I did this in order not to put pressure on my parents. Saidov added.

In a statement on March 19, the National Alliance called the behavior of the Tajik authorities a “crime against humanity” and asked the government to “stop taking hostages of relatives and friends of political opponents.”

The President of the Republic of Tajikistan was in Germany in October 2023, when the opposition gathered against him, raised slogans and threw eggs at his car. This situation provoked the anger of the authorities and the relatives of some of the opponents were arrested and some were completely deprived of the use of electricity.

Human Rights Watch said in a report at that time that about 50 relatives of Berlin protesters were arrested in Tajikistan and some were released only after interrogation.

Source: Ozodi

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Infighting over the succession and growing frustration in the regions could shatter the stability that the Tajik president has been building for so many years.

Next year will mark thirty years of Emomali Rahmon’s presidency in Tajikistan, now the only country in Central Asia that has not seen a change of leadership since the early 1990s. Unsurprisingly, there have been rumors of an imminent transition of power for a decade.

The name of the successor is no secret: it’s Rahmon’s son, thirty-six-year-old Rustam Emomali. But there is no consensus within the president’s large family over the succession. Some of the president’s other children have their own ambitions to run the country, which could upset plans for the transition.

President Rahmon is seventy-one years old, and has reportedly suffered numerous health issues. Arrangements for the transition have long been in place, but events keep getting in the way of its implementation: first the pandemic and its economic fallout, and then the street protests in neighboring Kazakhstan in January 2022, which frightened the Tajik leader and persuaded him it was not a good time to step down. Even Turkmenistan has seen a power transition in recent years. Now Tajikistan is expected to implement its own in 2024.

Rustam has already headed a number of government agencies. Since 2017, he has been mayor of Dushanbe: a post he has combined since 2020 with that of speaker of the upper house of parliament, to whom power would automatically pass if the current president were to step down early.

His supporters argue that as the capital’s mayor, he has improved the city, supported youth initiatives, and started to form his own team of young technocrats. Some are counting on him to carry out at least limited reforms once he is in power, such as those seen in neighboring Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

Not everyone believes Rustam is ready to take over, however. The future president is an unknown quantity for most Tajiks. All of his public appearances are prerecorded and accompanied by information read out by the broadcaster, meaning that people have not even heard him speak. His nickname on social media is “the great mute.”

More worryingly, the heir apparent has reportedly shot and wounded two people: his own uncle in 2008, and—just last year—the head of the State Committee for National Security, Saimumin Yatimov, supposedly for refusing to carry out orders.

There are those within the presidential family who do not want to see Rustam succeed his father because they fear losing prestigious posts in government and business. They are indignant that there are no relatives within the team he is building. The current president cannot possibly keep everyone happy, and this could threaten the transition, as ambitious clan members prepare to battle it out for the top job in order to retain their privileges.

Rahmon has seven daughters and two sons. The most ambitious of them is generally considered to be the second daughter Ozoda, who has headed up the presidential administration since 2016. She is very experienced, works well with her staff, and has the trust of the security services. Unsurprisingly, given the alleged shooting incident, there is no love lost between Rustam and the country’s main security official Yatimov, who has reportedly been paving the way for Ozoda’s candidacy. In addition, her husband Jamoliddin Nuraliev is also considered a very influential figure, having been deputy chair of the country’s central bank for over seven years.

Another contender for the presidency could be Rahmon’s fifth daughter, Ruhshona, a seasoned diplomat who is well versed in Tajikistan’s political affairs. Her husband is the influential oligarch Shamsullo Sohibov, who made his fortune thanks to his family connection to the president. Together with his brothers, he controls entire sectors of the economy, including transport, media, and banking. Change at the top could deprive the Sohibov clan of both influence and money, so Ruhshona and her husband may well throw their hats into the ring.

They might get the backing of Rahmon’s other children, who also control various sectors of the economy, including air travel (the third daughter, Tahmina) and pharmacies (the fourth daughter, Parvina). There are also plenty of Rahmon’s more distant relatives who owe their fortunes to the president and fear losing their positions under his successor.

Rahmon has relied on the loyalty of various relatives to ensure the stable functioning of his regime. But overly vociferous squabbles within the family could destabilize the situation, and for precisely this reason, Rahmon has tried to temper their ambition. Ruhshona, for example, was sent to the UK as Tajik ambassador to stop her from interfering in the plans for the transition. Her oligarch husband went with her.

Nor is the heir apparent himself outside the fray. There is evidence that Rustam was involved in leaking information to the media about his sister Ozoda’s alleged affair with her driver: something that, in patriarchal Tajikistan, caused serious damage to her reputation. There are also rumors that Ozoda’s main ally Yatimov will be retired from his post as head of the security services and replaced with a close friend of Rustam, Shohruh Saidov.

Right now, international circumstances are conducive to a swift transition. Tajikistan’s relations with its trickiest neighbors, Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan, are improving. While the Taliban has yet to be recognized as the legitimate Afghan government by Dushanbe, both sides agreed to strengthen economic ties during the first visit to Tajikistan by a delegation from the radical Islamist movement in March this year. Meanwhile, the Tajik government has pledged to resolve the border dispute with Kyrgyzstan—an issue that has led to several armed clashes in the last three years—by spring 2024. Rahmon is clearly trying to hand over a stable country to his son.

The situation at home, however, is more complicated. There is also considerable opposition to Rustam’s candidacy among the regional elites, who have long supported Rahmon in exchange for access to state resources, and are now seeing many of the most lucrative cash flows appropriated by the presidential family. A transition of power could be an opportune moment to express their displeasure.

Events in Gorno-Badakhshan in spring 2022 were a stark warning of the dangers of that displeasure. After the civil war that ravaged the country in the early 1990s, many of its field commanders settled in the region. Over time, they became informal leaders of the local communities, helping to solve problems that the central government was ignoring, sometimes strong-arming local officials into making the required decision. Rahmon ordered several security operations to rid Gorno-Badakhshan of this dual power system, only for it to reemerge further down the line.

Last spring, protests erupted there after a local man was killed by law enforcement officers. The unrest lasted for several months until Rahmon crushed it by force. Many of the activists were killed or imprisoned, while others fled the country, and the region was brought back under Dushanbe’s control. But the anger simmering in the region could boil over again at the first sign of conflict.

For now, the other regions remain loyal to the regime, but that could change after the power transition if the local elites feel they are not getting sufficient state resources.

By directing all the streams of income and control of the country to his own relatives, Rahmon has painted himself into a corner. Infighting over the succession and growing frustration in the regions could shatter the stability that the president has been building for so many years. Power transitions rarely go to plan in Central Asia, and Tajikistan may be no exception.

Source

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Giant portraits of President Emomali Rahmon adorn even the most nondescript buildings in Tajikistan’s capital of Dushanbe. Throughout the country, his sayings are featured on posters and billboards. Their ubiquitous presence underscores the consolidation of power by Rahmon – officially described as “Founder of Peace and Unity, Leader of the Nation” – since he emerged victorious from the 1992-1997 Tajikistan civil war that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. After three decades in power, he has established himself as an absolute ruler with no tolerance for dissent.

Rahmon’s bid to centralize control includes efforts to silence political opponents, human rights activists, and independent voices. More than a decade ago, Tajikistan’s media environment was relatively diverse and allowed for some criticism and debate, as long as local media avoided reporting on the president and his extensive family. Now, Tajikistan’s media are in their worst state since the violent years of the civil war, journalists told a Committee to Protect Journalists’ representative during a visit to the country late last year and through messaging apps.

Seven journalists were sentenced to lengthy prison terms in retaliation for their work in 2022 and 2023. The United Nations Human Rights Council has criticized “the apparent use of anti-terrorism legislation to silence critical voices” and expressed concern about reports alleging that torture was used to obtain false confessions from prisoners.

In one telling sign of the climate of fear that prevails in Tajikistan, only two among the more than a dozen journalists, press freedom advocates, and experts that CPJ met with were willing to speak on the record.

Some key takeaways from CPJ’s visit:

‘The collapse of independent Tajik journalism’

Prior to 2022, Tajikistan rarely jailed journalists. “For the president [Rahmon], it was important to be able to say we don’t touch journalists,” one local journalist told CPJ.

That changed with the unprecedentedly harsh sentences meted out to the seven convicted in 2022 and 2023 on what are widely seen as charges in retaliation for their work. Four journalists – Abdullo Ghurbati, Zavqibek Saidamini, Abdusattor Pirmuhammadzoda, and Khurshed Fozilov – received sentences of seven or seven-and-a-half years, Khushom Gulyam eight years, Daler Imomali, 10 years, and Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva, 20 years – a development seen by many as a deeply chilling escalation in the years-long constriction of independent media.

For Abdumalik Kadirov, head of the independent trade group Media Alliance of Tajikistan, 2022 marked “the collapse of independent Tajik journalism.”

Interviewees told CPJ that only two significant independent media voices now remain in Tajikistan: privately owned news agency Asia-Plus and U.S. Congress-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s local service, the Czech Republic-headquartered Radio Ozodi.  

Both regularly face harassment and threats. Their websites have long been subjected to partial shutdowns by local internet service providers – the result of behind-the-scenes orders from state officials, according to local journalists, so that authorities can deny responsibility for the outages.

Asia-Plus has been forced to moderate its content, reducing its political coverage, following a May 2022 threat from authorities to shutter its operations.

A handful of other outlets either avoid political topics entirely, struggle to maintain independence in the face of government repression, or barely function due to lack of funding, multiple sources said. Adding to challenges for journalists are less visible forms of pressure, such as threats of tax fines and surveillance of their work.

“Everything is done indirectly,” one journalist said. “[The authorities] have many levers. They can make it known to a [financially] struggling outlet that it will be hit with huge tax fines, or its management will face criminal charges, and it’s advisable just to lay things down.” Several interviewees said that each media outlet has a “curator” from law enforcement agencies as a reminder that it is being watched, and authorities can threaten rigged tax or other inspections, or even order advertisers to pull their ads.

Particularly since authorities banned the country’s main opposition party in 2015, key independent media have been forced into closure and “dozens” of journalists have chosen exile. A government decree enacted shortly after this requires media outlets to pass an inspection by state security services prior to registration, the head of the National Association of Independent Media of Tajikistan (NANSMIT) Nuriddin Karshiboev told CPJ, with “virtually no new independent media” on the national level being registered since.

Rising fear and self-censorship

The year 2022 had a “devastating” effect on Tajikistan’s already embattled independent media, one journalist said. Several interviewees linked the crackdown on journalists to the authorities’ brutal suppression of protests in the eastern Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region in May-June 2022. Immediately after those protests erupted, authorities arrested 66-year-old journalist and human rights defender Mamadshoeva on charges of organizing the unrest, airing what many believe to be a forced confession days later on state TV.

Four journalists with RFE/RL and its project Current Time TV were attacked after interviewing Mamadshoeva immediately before her arrest, and authorities’ shuttering threat against Asia-Plus was issued over its coverage of events in Gorno-Badakhshan. While most of the other jailed journalists did not cover Gorno-Badakhshan, analysts told CPJ their arrests were in part calculated to have a chilling effect on the press amid the crackdown in that region.

Above all, interviewees said, 2022 entrenched a climate of fear and exacerbated already high levels of self-censorship among journalists. “We don’t know who might be next,” one journalist said. “2022 silenced all of us, not just those who were arrested,” said another. “Journalists fear saying anything.”

Several journalists told CPJ they themselves self-censored more following the events of 2022, which had left increasing uncertainty over “red lines,” the topics that are off limits. “Before it was easier as the red lines were clearer – the president and his family, top state officials, and after 2015, coverage of exiled opposition leaders,” one analyst said. “Now, it’s unpredictable – what you might consider neutral, [the authorities] might not. This unpredictability is the most problematic thing for journalism.”

Others agreed with what Kadirov described as a “dramatic fall” in the number of critical articles and an increasing tendency for local media to avoid domestic politics in favor of “safe” topics such as culture, sport, and some international news.

The convictions of five of the seven jailed journalists in 2022-23 on charges of “participation” in banned political groups allowed authorities to successfully portray independent journalists as “extremists,” several interviewees said. “Society falls for this,” one journalist said, “and members of the public often do not want to speak to journalists, and experts are increasingly wary of doing so.”

The events of 2022 also deepened the sense of alienation between independent journalists and authorities and the public. Where 10 to 15 years ago authorities were forced to reckon with independent media as “a real public watchdog,” noted one analyst, officials now engage less and less with the media, rejecting or ignoring their information requests. Access to information remains “an urgent problem of Tajik journalism,” according to Karshiboev, despite some recent encouraging discussions between authorities and media organizations on how to address the issue.

Decline in international donors

“Tajik media’s biggest problem is finances,” Karshiboev told CPJ. Lacking domestic sources of funding amid a limited advertising market, Tajikistan’s independent media have for years been reliant on international donors, interviewees said. Yet in recent years donor support has significantly declined, particularly since the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine. “All Western resources and attention go to Ukraine,” one analyst lamented. Others cited a longer-term “donor fatigue” – donor organizations have lost interest in Tajikistan in particular and Central Asia more widely “because they don’t see any improvement,” one journalist said. A particular blow was the withdrawal of the Soros Foundation, previously a major media donor, from Tajikistan at the end of 2022.

Others argued that the problem was not so much a decline in donor funding as its misdirection – away from critical media and much-needed measures for media defense and toward projects of questionable value. Among other reasons, several argued that the ultimate problem is that international donors know the media is a sore spot for the Tajik government and, as Karshiboev put it, “fear damaging relations if they provide real and effective support to journalism.”

Interviewees said donors may also feel constrained by the West’s limited ability to influence on human rights issues in a country with such strong ties to Russia and China. “The Tajik government has increasingly learnt that it can act badly without any major consequences,” one analyst emphasized to CPJ. The war in Ukraine has exacerbated that dynamic.

“Before, when there wasn’t this standoff between Russia and the West, Tajikistan still looked to the West,” one journalist said. “Now they think: ‘What can the West do’?”  

A bleak outlook

Despite memories of a freer media environment only a generation ago, few of the journalists who spoke to CPJ were optimistic about the prospects for Tajik journalism in the near or mid-term future.

Many noted that Tajik journalists have become “demoralized” following 2022, that there’s been an uptick in journalists fleeing the country or leaving the profession, and that young people are reluctant to choose journalism as a career.

A marginalized independent media sector is very convenient for the government, said one analyst, “so it is unlikely to get better.” External support, in the form of more pressure and better targeted funding from Western and international donors and governments, was one of few factors capable of pushing developments in a more positive direction, several interviewees said. Kadirov and others believe that authorities’ tight control over traditional media outlets will cause independent journalists to turn more to social media and blogging to publish their reporting, making authorities likely to seek to exert even more control over those forums too.

“I see my mission as maintaining independent journalism – I can’t say in a good condition – but maintaining it at least to wait for better days,” said Kadirov.

CPJ emailed the Presidential Administration and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan for comment, but did not receive any replies.

Source: CPJ

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Up-and-down relations between Iran and Tajikistan in the past decade shot up again after Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s official visit to Dushanbe on November 8-9, his second trip to the Tajik capital in 18 months.

Raisi’s visit to Tajikistan was symbolically important amid a rapprochement between the countries that overshadowed the relatively standard batch of bilateral agreements that were signed.

During the trip, Raisi and his Tajik counterpart, Emomali Rahmon, announced a historic visa-free travel agreement for their citizens and deals in trade, transportation, and culture, among others.

High-ranking visits have become a regular occurrence between the two countries in the past year — with Iranian Defense Minister Reza Qaraei Ashtiani visiting Tajikistan in October and chief prosecutor Mohammad Jaafar Montazeri leading a judiciary delegation to Dushanbe in June.

But relations haven’t always been rosy between the two Persian-speaking countries, which share close linguistic, cultural, and historical ties as well as a common key ally, Russia.

Ties were marred in the past decade by tensions that saw the severing of investment and export deals, the suspension of direct flights, and the closure of Iranian charity and culture centers in Tajikistan.

Iran angered Tajikistan in 2015 by inviting the head of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) to a conference just months after the party was very dubiously banned and branded a terrorist group by Dushanbe.

Enraging Dushanbe further, IRPT leader Muhiddin Kabiri was photographed being greeted by Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei at the event.

The relationship plunged to a new low in 2017 when Tajik state television — a government mouthpiece — accused Iran of financing and ordering political assassinations in Tajikistan after a string of prominent public figures, including politicians and scholars, were killed between 1997 and 2004.

In response, Iran accused Tajikistan of making baseless, blatant lies.

On Again, Off Again

Amid the tensions, Rahmon didn’t attend President Hasan Rohani’s second-term swearing-in ceremony in 2017. But all seemed forgotten when Dushanbe and Tehran started mending ties and Rohani visited Dushanbe in June 2019.

In September 2020, Tajik state TV aired another controversial documentary accusing Iran of financing militant activity in Tajikistan.

Tehran called the claim a “baseless allegation” and warned Dushanbe about “the consequences of behavior” that breaches “the rules of friendly relations.”

The documentary came as the Tajik Supreme Court reportedly jailed some 50 Tajiks — former graduates of Iranian universities — on charges of treason and religious extremism in closed-door trials.

Because the Tajik state media and the judiciary reflect precise government positions on issues, Dushanbe’s motives behind delivering a new blow to its ties with Iran are unclear.

What Does The Future Hold?

Rahmon also failed to attend Raisi’s inauguration ceremony in August 2021, citing a prior engagement. But the two presidents did meet the following month, when Raisi chose Tajikistan as the destination for his first foreign trip as president, coupling it with attendance at a key regional security summit.

Bilateral ties have, since then, increasingly strengthened.

In early 2022, Dushanbe and Tehran announced plans to increase bilateral trade to $500 million in future from just $121 million in 2021. And Rahmon went to Tehran in May 2022 — his first trip to Tehran in nine years, as relations were rekindled.

Ahmet Furkan Ozyakar, a Turkish-based expert on regional politics, said Iran’s “look-toward-the-east policy under President Raisi is…a noteworthy determinant in advancing relations with Dushanbe” amid Iran’s severe economic problems due to Western sanctions over Tehran’s controversial nuclear program.

“In the upcoming months we expect more official meetings between Dushanbe and Tehran at the ministerial level as part of this rapprochement in joint military and security agreements, along with increasing trade capacities,” Ozyakar, a lecturer on international relations at Ataturk University, told RFE/RL.

But given the recent history of the ups and downs between Iran and Tajikistan, some analysts are not as optimistic.

Touraj Atabaki, a prominent Middle East and Central Asia expert, doesn’t rule out the possibility of new “problems” arising in the foreseeable future. Atabaki, professor emeritus at Leiden University, says any major political changes within one of these two countries or international developments could affect relations between Dushanbe and sanctions-hit Iran.

“Tajikistan’s approach to international affairs is different from Iran’s approach on that matter. Challenges in the world arena might either bring them closer or break them apart — challenges like Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine or the current [Israel-Hamas] war, which threatens to spread to the wider West Asia region,” Atabaki told RFE/RL.

Source

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The first step to solving a problem is admitting that it exists.

Telecommunications regulators in Tajikistan have taken a surprising step in that direction by reportedly admitting this week that a staggering 95 percent of the country’s territory is covered by only outdated 2G mobile connections.

This situation is in no small part due to the State Communications Service itself. In addition to regulating the sector, the service and the people running it are also major market players, albeit in highly nebulous ways that would be unthinkable almost anywhere else in the world.

Last weekend, the regulator announced that it is allowing two mobile telecommunications operators, MegaFon Tajikistan and Tcell, to source internet data through international channels instead of relying, as all ISPs are now required to do, on a state-run data spigot called the Unified Electronic Communications Switching Center, or EKTs in its commonly deployed Russian-language acronym. 

EKTs is operated by joint-stock phone and internet company Tojiktelecom, which is in turn run by the State Communications Service, a body that has been long run by a relative by marriage of President Emomali Rahmon. This in effect has made Tojiktelecom a for-profit monopoly run by a government service designed in theory to protect consumer interests. 

The ostensible purpose of the EKTs is to grant the state powers to fully vet internet traffic, for security reasons, among other things. The most noticeable impact of this arrangement, however, is that Tajikistan has some of the worst internet speeds in the world. The Amsterdam-headquartered company that operates the Beeline brand and Sweden-based mobile phone company TeliaSonera have both pulled out of Tajikistan amid difficulties navigating a market riddled with corruption and arbitrary policy-making. 

It is unclear what has prompted the telecoms regulator to ease the current monopolistic set-up. 

It is known that at least some parts of the ruling family are frustrated with the current situation. In January 2022, President Rahmon’s son and presumed successor-in-waiting, Rustam Emomali, complained about the quality of service provided by mobile companies. Emomali was especially exercised by what he said was the discrepancy between the quality of service advertised and what was actually provided.

Even Rahmon had grounds for being annoyed. A source at one mobile telecommunications company last year told Eurasianet, on condition of anonymity, that they and industry peers were ordered to work on improving the quality of their service after an incident, also in January 2022, in which Rahmon experienced trouble staying online during a Collective Security Treaty Organization virtual summit. Other participants in that online video call included Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. 

“During the meeting, his connection dropped out about seven to 10 times. The president was angered by the quality of the internet and reprimanded the head of the communications service,” the source told Eurasianet.

But that reprimand was evidently not sufficient to unseat that official, Beg Sabur, who is related to Rahmon by marriage, or bring about any significant change. While there has been a marginal improvement in internet speeds since December 2022, the overall trajectory remains dispiriting. 

Source: EurasiaNet

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Frankfurt, Brussels (6/10 – 27)

While Tajik authorities have not been able to lay their hands on their activist opponents living in Europe, they are able to turn the screws on their families and relatives, back in the old country.

The recent case of arrest of family members took place shortly after President Emomali Rahmon’s visit to Germany, to attend a summit of Central Asian leaders, at the end of last month. Throughout Rahmon’s visit, he was trailed by demonstrators holding up placards bearing pictures of political prisoners and calling him a dictator. When Rahmon headed to the Bundestag on September 29, protestors reportedly pelted his convoy with eggs, with one of them reportedly striking the President’s window.

Tajik security services then resorted to arbitrarily punishing people inside Tajikistan for the actions of their relatives overseas. Relatives of Sharoffidin Gadoev, Dilshod Sharifov, Ismoil Mahmadov, Jamshed Sharifov, Behruz Taghoizoda, and Muhammadjon Abdulloev – all members of the opposition Group 24 – were detained over the weekend on unspecified charges.

Opposition activist Sharoffidin Gadoev reported that Oishamo Abdulloeva, his 72-year-old mother, was detained on the morning of October 1. Gadoev, who took responsibility for the September 29 egg attack on Rahmon’s car, said that as the officers were taking his mother away, they angrily asked her why her son dared to call [Rahmon] a dictator and threw eggs at the President’s car in Berlin.

Ubaidullo Saidi, a participant in the protests, wrote in a Facebook post that security services officers had detained his father in the Rasht District. Saidi said agents called him and offered to release the old man on the condition that he return to Tajikistan.

Farhod Odinaev, a German-based Tajik activist, said that security forces came to his home in Tajikistan and wanted to take away his elderly mother, but instead decided to take his nephew. They asked Odinaev’s mother why (Tajiki opposition abroad) would dare to throw eggs at the car of the ‘Leader of the Nation’. Odinaev had spent 43 days in a Belarusian detention center after being detained on a Tajik request in 2019.

Police and security forces in Tajikistan have yet to acknowledge or comment on the arrests. According to RFE/RL sources, Abdulloev was one of more than a dozen people released in the early hours of October 3. At least seven relatives of the oppositions activists – all men – are still being held. Azda.tv, an exiled opposition-run website, has compiled numerous accounts detailing the detention of family members of the overseas opposition. In some families, five to six individuals are at times detained and interrogated about what their sons are up to, participating in protests in Europe, and why they are involved in politics at all.

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European Parliament members have strongly condemned ongoing repression by the authorities of Tajikistan against journalists, activists and protesters in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO). A history of violence escalated extending several years, following confrontational events in November 2021 and May 2022 where dozens of civilians were killed.

The European Parliament has since passed a resolution on 7 July 2022. European deputies called on the Tajik government to “put an end to repression against the residents of GBAO”.

“We call on the government of Tajikistan to stop persecuting protesters, independent journalists, human rights defenders, lawyers and civil society activists, allowing them to carry out their work freely and without the fear of losing their lives.”

Deputies also called on Tajik authorities to immediately release detained activists and journalists, namely Ulfathonim Mamadshoeva, Daleri Imomali, Abdullo Gurbati, Manuchehr Kholiknazarov, Faromuz Irgashov, Khursand Mamadshoev, Chorshanbe Chorshanbiev and Amriddin Alovatshoev.

The crackdown by Tajik security forces in Rushan on May 18, 2022 turned into a tragedy with numerous casualties among protesters. Local witnesses told of snipers and military helicopters firing live ammunition at civilians, killing at least 40. A violent dispersal in Khorog left many protesters dead and some wounded.

The firm resolution of the European Parliament asserts the collective expression of concern about “deterioration of the human rights situation” in GBAO. May 14, 2022 saw a protest in Khorog, the capital of GBAO, home to the Pamiri people. About 1,000 Pamiri citizens had gathered to peacefully demand the resignation of regional leader Alisher Mirzonabatov, known locally as “The Butcher of the Pamir.” They also demanded an effective investigation into the murder by security forces of Gulbidin Ziyobekov in November 2021.

The authorities rejected these demands and delivered an ultimatum, that if demonstrators did not disperse by 4 p.m. on 16 May 2022, they would be removed by force.

On 16 May 2022, government authorities cut off all internet access and shut down the mobile phone network over GBAO. This halt on the internet continued on until the end of June 2022, resulted in difficulties in obtaining verified information and news out of this region during that period. However, there were posts on social media based on eyewitness reports, describing how security forces arbitrarily broke into homes and ransacked them, seized mobile phones and arbitrarily detaining residents. There are also allegations of torture and extra-judicial executions of Pamiris detained during the crackdown.

Reports said that President Emomali Rahmon’s security forces attacked the civilians with tear gas grenades and this continued till 17 May 2022. On 18 May, the Ministry of the Interior announced that it would carry out an “anti-terrorist operation” in Rushan District, where mobile, landline, and internet communication was subsequently cut, and people were denied the right to enter or leave the area under occupation.

Violence by the regime escalated when residents attempted to block the road to Khorog with their cars, to prevent a military convoy from entering the city. The crackdown in Rushan turned into a tragedy, with numerous casualties among protesters. Local witnesses told of snipers and military helicopters firing live ammunition at civilians, killing at least 40. A violent dispersal in Khorog left many protesters dead and some wounded.

The culmination of the event was the assassination of Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov, an influential local leader and a hero standing against Rahmon’s authoritarian regime. He was shot dead by government security forces on 22 May 2022.

The European Parliament also warned Tajikistan that “the fight against terrorism and violent extremism must not be used as a pretext to suppress the opposition.” It reiterated that “those who were arbitrarily detained be released immediately and all charges against them dropped.”

However, experts are of the opinion that consideration of the issue of the situation in GBAO and the adoption by the European Parliament of a resolution on this issue will in no way have any effect on the actions of Tajik authorities toward this autonomous region. Nearly a year has passed, with no significant response by Tajik authorities to the resolution of the European Parliament. The key question: will the EU act like “a snow leopard” by demanding Tajik authorities comply with the resolutions that have been handed down, or will they be seen as “paper tigers” keeping quiet about the brutal, illegal and inhumane acts by that country?

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Dubai (5/7 – 75)

The government of Tajikistan’s campaign against the operations of a charitable organization funded by the Agha Khan, the spiritual leader of the country’s Ismaili minority, has intensified over the past few weeks.

In the most recent development, the authorities have revoked the license of the Aga Khan Lycée in Khorog, the capital of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region, or GBAO. A source at the Aga Khan Foundation told Eurasianet that June 30 was the last day that the secondary school would operate under its aegis. 

The Aga Khan Development Network, the umbrella organization under which that foundation operates, has been providing assistance to Tajikistan in education and healthcare since the early years of independence. One major achievement has been the construction of the University of Central Asia in Khorog, where teaching is carried out in English.

Whenever the current Aga Khan visited Tajikistan between 1992 and 2011, tens of thousands of Ismailis, who hail primarily from the country’s Pamir highlands, flocked to see him in person. It is believed, however, that the clamor around the Aga Khan has incurred the displeasure of President Emomali Rahmon, upon whom a lavish personality cult has been built.

The Aga Khan Development Network has been providing assistance in education and healthcare to Tajikistan since the early years of its independence. In the latest development, the government of Tajikistan’s campaign against Aga Khan, the spiritual leader of the country’s Ismaili minority, has intensified over the past few weeks.

The Pamiris have been on the receiving end of a sustained campaign of repression from the authorities in Dushanbe. A security sweep dubbed an anti-terrorist operation in May 2022 led to the killing of dozens of community leaders. Hundreds more were imprisoned after secretive trials on grounds that they were purportedly plotting to cause political turmoil.

It was after that drama played out that the government began moving to dismantle paraphernalia related to the Aga Khan and, furthermore, appropriating assets belonging to his foundation.

According to Pamir Daily News, a Telegram channel that covers events in the Pamirs, the government has to date nationalized multiple educational initiatives run by the Aga Khan Education Service.

The upmarket Serena Hotel in Khorog and the premises of the First Microfinance Bank and the Mountain Societies Development Support Program, or MSDSP, have similarly been confiscated, according to reports. And the Prosecutor’s Office in the GBAO has applied with the courts to nationalize the Aga Khan Medical Center in Khorog.

A source at a Aga Khan organization has told Eurasianet that these developments have led to the loss of around 300 jobs for local people in Khorog, where unemployment is rife.

The pressure has been applied in other forms too.

The Ismaili Centers in Khorog and Dushanbe, the capital, have been banned for holding events for the promotion of religious literacy.

Source : Eurasia

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Dushanbe, Tajikistan, Central Asia (15/6 – 60)

On 28 April, President Emomali Rahmon who has ruled Tajikistan since 1992 signed into law a Decree imposing the Procedure for “burying the bodies of terrorists neutralised in the course of a counterterrorism operation”. In the regime’s parlour, this means the bodies of those killed and/or assassinated.

The new procedure denies the families of those killed in what the regime calls “anti-terrorism operations” the possibility of burying the dead in a place they want, knowing where the dead are buried, investigating how the death occurred, and burying the dead with the religious or other rites the dead or the family would have chosen.

The regime’s “vanishing martyrs” is already backfiring, although the regime attempts to erase all traces of the killed from the social life and history books of the troubled country. According to social media posts circulated in Tajikistan and neighbouring countries in the region, flowers mysteriously appear on the gravesites of the slayed Pamiri’s.

For the dead such as these, the regime resorted to the usual suppressive measures to ‘warn’ relatives not to visit the graveyard. The regime and its KGB-style security apparatus wants them dead, forgotten and erased from the collective memory.

One prominent opposition leader said this move shows the Tajik regime and the KGB-successor are desperate to please the kleptocratic family. The tune of – these were all ‘terrorists’, is shale and holds very little credibility.

He added, “The more the Rahmon regime tries to supress us, the more ordinary Tajiks are joining the resistance. History is a cruel teacher as we saw other dictatorships.”

The new law states, that state authorities “determined by the organs of the initial investigation” are to bury such individuals at a place the states choose, “and the place of burial must not be revealed to anyone.” Burial records must not give the name of the individual, and the dead are to be transported to the place of burial in closed coffins which must not be examined.

Tajikistan bans the families of those killed in what the regime calls “anti-terrorism operations”, the right to burying the deceased in a place they want, knowing where they are buried, investigating how the death occurred, and burying the dead with the religious or other rites the dead or the family would have chosen.

The most immediate targets of the Procedure are Ismaili Muslims and others in the Mountainous Badakhshan Region (GBAO) who have been killed by regime forces in a so-called “anti-terrorism operation” since November 2021.

A human rights defender who wished to remain anonymous for fear of state reprisals told the reporters that, “I think the authorities want to punish the relatives of those they killed, as well as publicly threaten that people who protest the government will die and will not be buried as Muslims. This is all done to threaten the public”.

Local leaders are enraged by the regimes disrespect for Islamic culture of the Pamiri’s and some observers predict this policy will give further rise to the resistance against the dictatorship of President Rahmon and his ilk.

“The authorities are enforcing the Decree violently,” human rights defender and journalist Anora Sarkorova told western media. She knew of a case in early May 2023 when the secret police in Rushan tortured the relative of a protestor.

Sources in Tajikistan informed governments of Norway and the EU that the Tajik successor of the KGB, the NSC and Interior Ministry have also both recently warned relatives of protestors killed in 2022 not to put up gravestones with the names of the deceased. Warnings to relatives were reported as early as May 2022.

“If relatives will not listen to the warnings and decide to put up gravestones with names, they threatened the relatives with imprisonment,” sources told civil society bodies in Brussels.

Tajikistan’s legally binding international human rights obligations condemn such regime actions. In separate rulings on Tajikistan relating to men executed earlier under the death penalty, the UN Human Rights Committee used almost identical language to condemn refusal to notify relatives of the circumstances of the death, hand over the body of the deceased, and identify the place of burial. The UN Committee also stated that Tajikistan “is also under an obligation to prevent similar violations in the future”.

But the regime is impervious about calls for reason setting the stage for a new uprising. “Families were not allowed to conduct an Islamic ritual washing of the body themselves, to prevent them from seeing the injuries individuals had sustained”, Sarkorova added.

The Regime responds: “I have not even heard of such a Decree”.

Sodik Shonazarov, Senior Advisor of the Legal Policy Section of the Presidential Administration, refused to discuss the Decree with the reporters. He also refused to explain why the regime has banned Muslims burying their dead according to Islamic rites, and why the regime does not respect its human rights obligations relating to deceased people, their families and friends. He instead told reporters to talk to the Ombudsperson’s Office.

On June 7, Hamrokhon Davletov, Assistant to Ombudsperson Umed Bobozoda, took note of the questions on why Emomali Rahmon signed the Decree. When asked what the Ombudsperson’s Office is doing to guarantee the human rights the Decree violates, there were no replies or statements. The Ombudsperson is not independent of the regime and does not fully comply with the Paris Principles for National Human Rights Institutions.

Sanobar Baratzoda of the Interior Ministry’s General Section claimed that they not heard of such a Decree by the President.

The Assistant to the First Deputy Chair of the State Committee for Religious Affairs and Regulation of Traditions, Ceremonies and Rituals (SCRA) refused to discuss the Decree or human rights violations related to it. There was also no reply from SCRA spokesperson, Avshin Mukim.

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Emomali Rahmon will be accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Presidential Assistants for External Relations and Human Resources, the Minister of Energy, and chairmen of the Committees for Emergency Situations and Environmental Protection.

Rahmon’s visit to the United States will continue from March 20 to 24, the presidential press service reported. It is expected that within the framework of the working visit, Emomali Rahmon will hold meetings with the UN leadership, in particular with UN Secretary General António Guterres. More detailed information about the program of the President’s visit is unknown.

Tajikistan is one of the countries in the region that have submitted many proposals to the UN on water issues. Tajik officials are always proud to say that, at the request of Tajikistan, the United Nations has adopted several resolutions related to water. However, part of the population of Tajikistan still does not have access to clean drinking water.

Source: kokshetau

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