Xi’s strategy is as meticulous as it is bold. He has purged opposition within his ranks, securing a loyal cadre committed to his vision of Chinese supremacy on the world stage. His deft handling of relationships with giants like the US, India, Japan, and Russia has redefined traditional alliances and rivalries. For those watching, there’s a palpable sense of urgency – a recognition that we are witnessing the dawn of a new global order where China’s influence is inescapable and undeniable.

Meanwhile, the stage is set in India for a political showdown as the Lok Sabha Elections close. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is poised to secure a third consecutive term with his charisma (for his critics – an engineered charisma) and steadfast leadership. Despite murmurs of an upset from the Opposition Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA), Modi’s decade-long tenure has undeniably transformed India into a formidable force on the global stage despite growing dissent, frustrations, and inequality in the constituency. 

Under his watch, India’s economy has flourished and its population of 1.5 billion stands as its greatest asset, driving innovation and growth. As the election results loom, the world watches closely, recognising that India’s trajectory under Modi’s continued leadership could redefine the balance of power in Asia and beyond.

China and India hold the key to unlocking the full potential of Asia, bearing the hopes and aspirations of 4.5 billion people in the region. This is undeniably Asia’s century, a period marked by rapid growth, technological innovation, and unprecedented influence on the global stage. As China leverages its economic clout and India capitalises on its vast human resources, both nations are poised to lead Asia into a new era of prosperity and power. The world can no longer deny these two giants’ pivotal role in shaping Asia’s future and the world. 

Anti-Modi narratives

Focusing on the Indian elections, many predicted an easy victory for Modi, yet doubt crept in during the campaign trail with various narratives at play. A section of Western media and their proxies crafted stories forecasting Modi’s downfall, challenging his bid for a third consecutive term. 

Historically, Western media narratives have often been critical of Asia’s rise and this election cycle was no different. For decades, one of Asia’s finest, Lee Kuan Yew, showcased the hypocrisy of Western media with one-sided narratives and it was the turn of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to turn the heat on the Western press this time.

Hundreds of op-eds and articles from around the globe were critical of Premier Narendra Modi, and the BJP mushroomed during the campaign trail. Some projected Modi as a face and Home Minister Amit Shah as everything else. It would have been a tremendous and balanced story if they had also mentioned the Bush-Cheney and Blair-Mandelson combinations without projecting only in Asia, as these things occur. Politics is universal; no one has a monopoly on the power play.

However, dissent is reasonable as it allows you to recreate your narrative compellingly, if necessary; otherwise some of it can be ignored. Premier Modi and the Opposition leaders, such as Rahul and Priyanka Gandhi and Arvind Kejriwal, all faced cyberbullying and hate from millions of social media critics. 

Dhruv Rathee, a young Indian YouTuber with 20.8 million subscribers, was adored by the anti-Modi section and hated by the Modi lovers. On average, his videos had 15 million views; some reaching 25 million views based on controversial subjects. Some of my colleagues who held independent or anti-Modi sentiments wanted to end Modi rule. Some were fearless and some were fearful. Young Rathee has shown the price of being daring, taking on a “tyrant,” as he narrated. Some enjoy money, some want fame, and some want power. Some want all three.

In our digital age, anti-Modi sentiments were widely disseminated and consumed. However, the impact on India’s 960 million voters will only become apparent in a few days as the world watches to see if these narratives swayed the electorate.

Modi and BJP campaign

The Modi and BJP campaign was bolstered by a decade of tangible successes, earning credibility despite facing numerous challenges and frustrations. Modi was presented as the definitive leader, synonymous with India’s recent economic strides and global presence. 

In contrast, the Opposition’s campaign lacked a singular anchor, relying instead on a collective team effort. Going up against a worldwide brand like Modi, with his track record of economic achievements, demanded a monumental and unified Opposition strategy. As election results loom, the question remains whether this collective effort was enough to challenge the incumbency and sway the electorate.

Modi projected himself as a divine gift to rejuvenate India and secure its rightful place on the global stage. This ‘messiah’ narrative is a familiar trope in political communications, evoking a sense of destiny and inevitability. 

The Opposition needed another charismatic leader or a robust alternative policy, action plan, and narrative to counter such an influential figure. However, Rahul and Priyanka Gandhi, the latest torchbearers of the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty, were criticised for their lack of imagination and coherence in their campaign. As a result, their efforts struggled to gain traction against Modi’s well-crafted persona and proven track record. 

It is seldom that a leader can blow his own trumpet. You need your allies to project how great you are. However, Modi said he was a godsend and gifted and his team said he was a godsend and gifted. It was missing in the Rahul and Priyanka duo. INDIA leaders like Kumar, Banerjee, Kejriwal, Yadav, Stalin, and Pawar seldom backed an anchor in cohesion. It’s understandable; all the above political brands are too big to sing hosanna for someone else. The fragile egos, personal interests, and political empires do not allow you to be united. Even in sports, all-star teams end up faring poorly. 

Modi, the saviour

Modi’s projection of himself as India’s saviour draws parallels to historical figures like Ashoka, Napoleon, and Alexander the Great, who also cast themselves as divinely-ordained leaders. After his transformative embrace of Buddhism, Ashoka positioned himself as a benevolent ruler destined to bring peace and prosperity to South Asia. Similarly, Napoleon portrayed himself as bringing order and reform to post-revolutionary France. At the same time, Alexander the Great saw himself as a destined conqueror, spreading Greek culture across the known world. 

In the book ‘Discovery of India’ (written in 1946), the great Jawaharlal Nehru (first Prime Minister of India from 1947 to 1964) writes: “Often, as I wandered from meeting to meeting, I spoke to my audience of this India of ours, of Hindustan and of Bharata, the old Sanskrit name derived from the mythical founder of the race. I seldom did so in the cities, for their audiences were more sophisticated and wanted strong fare. But to the peasant, with his limited outlook, I spoke of this great country for whose freedom we were struggling, of how each part differed from the other and yet was India, of common problems of the peasants from north to south and east to west, of the swaraj that only could be for all and every part and not for some. 

“I told them about journeying from the Khyber Pass in the far northwest to Kanyakumari or Cape Comorin in the distant south and how everywhere the peasants put me identical questions, for their troubles were the same – poverty, debt, vested interests, landlords, moneylenders, heavy rents and taxes, police harassment, and all these wrapped up in the structure that the foreign government had imposed upon us – and relief must also come for all. 

“I tried to make them think of India as a whole and even to some little extent of this wide world of which we were a part. I brought in the struggle in China, Spain, Abyssinia, Central Europe, Egypt, and the countries of Western Asia. I told them of the wonderful changes in the Soviet Union and the great progress made in America. The task was not easy, yet it was not so difficult as I had imagined, for our ancient epics, myths, and legends, which they knew so well, had made them familiar with the conception of their country. Some there were always who had travelled far and wide to the great places of pilgrimage, situated at the four corners of India.”

I quote him again: “Sometimes I reached a gathering, a great roar of welcome would greet me. ‘Bharat Mata Ki Jai’ – ‘Victory to Mother India’. I would ask them unexpectedly what they meant by that cry: who was this ‘Bharat Mata,’ Mother India, whose victory they wanted? My question would amuse them and surprise them, and then, not knowing exactly what to answer, they would look at each other and me. I persisted in my questioning. At last, a vigorous Jat, wedded to the soil from immemorial generations, would say it was the ‘dharti,’ the good earth of India, that they meant. What earth? Their particular village patch, or all the patches in the district or province, or in the whole of India? And so question and answer went on till they would ask me impatiently to tell them all about it. 

“I would endeavour to do so and explain that India was all this that they had thought, but it was much more. The mountains and the rivers of India, and the forests and the broad fields, which gave us food, were all dear to us, but what counted ultimately were the people of India, people like them and me, who were speared out all over this vast land. ‘Bharat Mata,’ Mother India, was essentially these millions of people, and victory to her meant victory to these people. You are parts of this ‘Bharat Mata,’ I told them, you are in a manner to yourselves ‘Bharat Mata,’ and as this idea slowly soaked into their brains, their eyes would light up as if they had made an extraordinary discovery.”

Rahul and Priyanka, the great-grandchildren of the great Jawaharlal Nehru, were leading the anti-Modi campaign. The above paragraph could have been their campaign narrative, but it was Modi’s campaign line for the last 10 years – and for the next five years, if he succeeds in securing a third successive term on 4 June. 

Religio-political wars

‘Bharat Mata’ was the underlying campaign theme for Modi 3.0, which took Nehru’s ‘Bharat Mata’ concept to a different level. Nehru was widely regarded for his stand for secular India but there are severe questions and critics of Modi’s path for India – weaponising Hinduism for political power. In India, approximately 80% of the population by religion are Hindus and 14% are believers of Islam as per the 2011 census. As per census reports, a 1951 to 2011 comparison shows a 5% reduction of Hindus and in the same period a 45% growth of believers of Islam. 

The religious political wars have become the norm again; even the rise of Muslim political leadership in the United Kingdom has been the talk of the town recently, with Sadiq Khan holding onto the Mayorship of London since 2016. In Indonesia, vote bank politics are shaping up, with Islam as a shield; in Russia, the orthodox church plays a role in politics; and in the US, Christian nationalism is on the rise. 

Unfortunately, over centuries, humankind has been divided by religion. Instead, can religion unite people? Can a rejuvenated Bharat show the way for tolerance, diversity, and harmony to the world? 

In the last 30 years, India rebranded its main cities from colonial names to national names. Today, Bombay is Mumbai, Calcutta is Kolkata, Madras is Chennai, Bangalore is Bengaluru, Poona is Pune, and Banaras is Varanasi. If Modi succeeds in securing his third successive term on 4 June, will we see Bharat instead of India? Bharat will be Modi’s Ashoka moment. If that occurs, this will be one of the most significant brand changes in humanity’s history.

Xi and the ‘Chinese dream’

Like Modi, Xi crafted a narrative positioning himself as the chosen one, uniquely destined to lead China into a new era of greatness. Xi didn’t rely solely on revolutionary or economic credentials like Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping. Instead, he blended these legacies, portraying himself as the leader who could fulfil China’s historic rejuvenation mission.

Just as Ashoka, Napoleon, and Alexander the Great used the mantle of destiny to consolidate their power, Xi presented himself as the harbinger of a ‘Chinese dream’ – a vision of national renewal and global prominence. Through sweeping reforms, an assertive foreign policy, and strategic purges within his party, Xi solidified his position, projecting an image of stability and certainty.

These modern leaders harnessed historical narratives of messianic leadership in China and India, crafting personas destined to elevate their nations. Modi and Xi’s stories underscore a timeless political truth: when a leader casts themselves as a divinely favoured saviour, it becomes a formidable task for any opposition to mount a practical challenge without an equally compelling vision or figurehead. As a result, their nations stand at the forefront of Asia’s rise, shaping the region’s destiny in profound and lasting ways.

Enter Arvind Kejriwal

In China, the one-party rule under Xi ensures a controlled political landscape. However, in India’s vibrant democracy, winning a third successive term is an uphill battle for any leader. Modi’s stature and the BJP’s well-oiled political machinery present formidable challenges. Yet, amidst this daunting scenario, INDIA began to find momentum in the middle of the campaign. 

Emerging against all odds, this coalition started to resonate with voters, presenting a united front capable of challenging Modi’s dominance. Its late surge introduced an element of unpredictability, with many fearing an upset. The alliance’s ability to galvanise support and craft a compelling narrative in the final stages underscored the dynamic and resilient nature of Indian democracy, where even the most entrenched leaders can face significant challenges.

Not many would agree with me, but the Arvind Kejriwal fiasco and his subsequent jail term significantly disrupted INDIA’s momentum. Suddenly, amid a carefully orchestrated campaign, the focus shifted entirely to Kejriwal. This unplanned and unwarranted incident highlights how fragile political campaigns can be. 

In the high-stakes arena of political campaigning, unexpected events can swiftly derail even the most well-planned strategies. INDIA, which had begun to find its footing and generate genuine enthusiasm, was blindsided by the controversy surrounding Kejriwal. Instead of pushing forward with its collective message, it was forced into a defensive position, grappling with damage control and standing for Kejriwal.

Power struggle on the cards

If Kejriwal survives his legal battles and Modi secures another victory, the political arena is set for a dramatic power struggle. Kejriwal, driven by boundless ambition and armed with a reputation for grassroots activism, could challenge the leadership of Rahul and Priyanka Gandhi within the Opposition. His relentless focus on anti-corruption (but he is booked for corruption now) and governance reforms resonates strongly with urban middle-class and disenfranchised voters, positioning him as a compelling alternative to Modi. 

This rise would inevitably clash with the Gandhis, who have long been the faces of the Congress Party and national politics. As Kejriwal’s influence grows, a fierce battle for dominance within the Opposition is likely to unfold, with his soaring ambitions threatening to overshadow the traditional leadership of the Gandhis. This internal struggle could redefine the dynamics of Indian politics, with both sides vying for the mantle of a chief challenger to Modi’s BJP.

‘Messiah’ narrative

The ‘messiah’ narrative is not confined to Asia. Donald Trump’s rise to the presidency in 2017 was a masterclass in creating a narrative more significant than life itself. With his ‘Make America Great Again’ slogan, he cast himself as the saviour of a nation that, in his telling, had lost its way. This powerful, emotionally-charged message resonated deeply with many Americans who felt left behind by the political establishment.

Trump’s unconventional, often irrational approach allowed him to dominate the news cycle and overshadow his opponent, Hillary Clinton. While Clinton campaigned on experience and policy, Trump ran circles around her with his relentless energy and brash rhetoric. His ability to tap into the fears and hopes of voters, combined with a relentless focus on his narrative of national rejuvenation, ultimately won him the day. Despite his unpredictability and contentious style, Trump’s message struck a chord, propelling him to a victory that defied conventional political logic. 

Trump vs. Biden in 2024 will be a great watch. The US needs a strongman at the negotiation table with Xi, Modi, and Putin. If the former President runs, he will inevitably invoke ‘Make America Great Again’ with more vigour than in 2016. The US is not Reagan’s US anymore. It’s easier to talk about the inner core desires of Americans for pride. The pride they grew up with is slowly vanishing by the day.

Politics makes strange bedfellows. It’s not for the faint-hearted. It’s a blood sport. It’s all about the art of possibility. It’s about capturing power and, most importantly, sustaining power. The below from ‘The Panchatantra’ sums up the world: ‘All things in the world live off one another, using many different strategies to do so, some peaceful, others not so peaceful. Think.’

Rulers live off their lands,

Physicians off the sick,

Merchants live off the consumers, 

They learned from fools;

Thieves live off the unwary,

Almsmen off householders;

Harlots off pleasure seekers,

And workers of the whole world.

Snares of many sorts are carefully set;

Day and night, they lie in wait, watchful,

Surviving by sheer strength – fish eating fish. 

Fish eating fish — for survival. Once in power, you would not want to leave. Politics is a microcosm of human life. ‘Messiahs’ are not immortal and there is a downside. The sustainability of the narrative depends on not only the leader’s code of conduct but also his followers and the machinery. 

In the midst of this, Asia is rising. There is hope for the world.

Source: The Morning

The post Asian roar appeared first on Ankara Haftalik.

Long before it was reported, at the end of January, that Volodymyr Zelensky had decided to replace his popular Army chief, Valery Zaluzhny, the Ukrainian counter-offensive of 2023 had devolved from attempted maneuvers to mutual recriminations. The arrows pointed in multiple directions: Zelensky seemed to think that his commander-in-chief was being defeatist; Zaluzhny, that his President was refusing to face facts. And there were arguments, too, between Ukraine and its allies. In a two-part investigation in the Washington Post, in early December, U.S. officials complained that Ukrainian generals did not follow their advice. They tried to attack in too many places; they were too cautious; and they waited too long to launch the operation. The Ukrainians, in turn, blamed the Americans. They delivered too few weapons and did so too late; they insisted on their tactics even when it was clear these were unsuitable for the terrain and the opponent; and they did all this from the comfort of Washington and Wiesbaden, rather than from the trenches, tree lines, and open fields where Ukrainian soldiers gave their lives.

The arguments were painful and significant. Was Zelensky right that, given the wobbliness of Western support, Ukraine had to keep up a brave face and the so-called military momentum, no matter the cost? Or was Zaluzhny right that a change of strategy and more troops were needed, no matter how unpopular these choices might be? The argument with the U.S. was significant, too. Was the failure of the counter-offensive, as the Americans argued, one of strategy or, as the Ukrainians counter-argued, one of equipment?

There was a third option: neither. The dominant factor was the Russian military. It was better than people had given it credit for, after its disastrous performance in the first year of the war. It was not demoralized, incompetent, or ill-equipped. Russian soldiers and their officers were fighting to the death. They had executed a brutal and effective defense and, despite all the losses they had incurred, they still had attack helicopters, drones, and mines. “People came to very strong conclusions based off the first month of the war,” Rob Lee, a former marine and an analyst of the Russian military at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, said. “And I think a lot of those conclusions were wrong.”

Being wrong about war can be disastrous, yet it is extremely common. The political scientist Stephen Biddle’s influential book, “Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle,” begins by listing a century of analytical mistakes. “In 1914,” he writes, “Europeans expected a short, decisive war of movement. None foresaw a nearly four-year trench stalemate—if they had, the war might never have happened. In 1940 Allied leaders were astonished by the Germans’ lightning victory over France. They had expected something closer to the trench warfare of 1914-18; even the victors were surprised.” Biddle goes on to describe the debate over the tank, deemed obsolete after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and then resurrected by its awesome performance in the Gulf War, in 1990 and 1991. Biddle’s book came out in 2004; since then, two major American wars, in Afghanistan and Iraq, have not gone as anyone had planned.

“It’s impossible, basically, to predict a future war,” Bettina Renz, an international-security professor at the University of Nottingham and an expert on the Russian military, said. “Most people who start a war think it will be over quickly. And, of course, nobody starts a war that they think they can’t win.”

Once a war ends, or even earlier, military historians begin to describe what happened and who was right. Some debates remain unsettled, because the war they theorize never takes place. A famous instance is a debate many years ago, on the pages of the journal International Security, over whether nato was adequately prepared for a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. The political scientists John Mearsheimer and Barry Posen, having calculated the relative balance of forces, said that it was; the defense intellectual Eliot Cohen, who had worked in the Pentagon’s famous Office of Net Assessment, said that it was not. The debate stretched over several months, in 1988 and 1989. A short while later, the Soviet Union ceased to exist.

The war in Ukraine has led to more than its share of arguments. In the run-up, the U.S. spent months warning skeptical allies that an invasion was imminent. This argument was mirrored inside Ukraine: Zaluzhny became convinced that the Russians were coming, and spent the weeks before the war urging a mobilization; Zelensky remained uncertain, and resisted the advice, worried that it would panic the population and give Russia an excuse to invade. There was widespread consensus that, in the event of an invasion, Russia would quickly win. General Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told congressional leaders in early February of 2022 that the Russian military might take Kyiv in as little as seventy-two hours.

When this did not happen, in part because Zaluzhny repositioned some of his forces without authorization and moved or camouflaged the country’s military hardware, a new round of arguments broke out. Was Russia a paper tiger, or did it simply fight in the stupidest possible way? Was China also overrated? Was the tank dead (again)?

Some of the figures in the argument were familiar: Eliot Cohen was back, urging the West to take a harder line with Russia (and China); so were Mearsheimer and Posen, counselling caution. (Mearsheimer sometimes went further, blaming the West for provoking the Russian bear and for violating the tenets of his books, which posit that great-power conflict is inevitable.) Both sides invoked Carl von Clausewitz, the nineteenth-century Prussian military theorist. Cohen cited Clausewitz’s observation that intangible “moral factors,” like the will to fight, are the most important thing in war; Cohen’s opponents held up Clausewitz’s arguments that defense always has the advantage, and also that war is the realm of contingency and chance. (“Clausewitz is like the Bible,” the American University international-relations scholar Joshua Rovner told me. “You can pull out parts of it to suit basically any argument.”)

Among analysts who had studied the Russian military and thought it would do much better than it did, there was some soul-searching. Russian units turned out to be shorthanded, and neither their cyberattacks nor their Air Force were as dominant as expected. The Ukrainian military had better cyber defenses than people realized, and they fought tenaciously. Importantly, they also had the full support of U.S. intelligence, which was able to tell them when and where Russian forces would try to land, and to help them prepare for it. But the biggest surprise was Vladimir Putin’s terrible war plan, which assumed that Ukrainians would not resist, and which he kept secret from his own Army until the eve of the invasion. “No one would have done a Ukraine war game that was set with the political and strategic starting conditions of the Ukraine conflict,” Scott Boston, a defense analyst at the rand Corporation who often “plays Russia” in the think tank’s war games, said. “You’d be kicked out of the room.”

So, was the Russian military as bad as it seemed, and would Russian lines collapse if subjected to a bit of pressure? Or was it a fundamentally competent military that had been given an impossible task? Boston said he kept thinking of the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, between Somali militants and American special forces, in which two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down and eighteen Americans were killed in a misbegotten snatch-and-grab mission inside the Somali capital: “You can take the best soldiers on the planet, and, if you throw them in a bad enough situation, it’s not going to go well.” Russian soldiers were not the best on the planet, but they were probably not as bad as they looked in that first month of the war, running out of gas for their tanks and asking locals for directions to Kyiv.

The very successful Ukrainian counter-offensive in the fall of 2022 presented evidence for both sides. In the Kharkiv region, thinly defended Russian lines collapsed when confronted with mobile Ukrainian units, allowing Ukraine to take back significant amounts of territory and cut off key Russian supply lines. But along the other axis of attack, in the city of Kherson, Russian forces held out for a long time and then made a large and orderly retreat, saving much manpower and matériel. The question became which army Ukraine would face in the summer and fall of 2023: the undermanned and demoralized one they saw in Kharkiv, or the organized and capable one they saw in Kherson?

The answer, unfortunately, turned out to be the latter. “The Russian military adapted,” Lee said. “They often require some painful lessons, but then they do adapt.” Lee agrees with some of the criticisms lobbed by both sides in the aftermath of the offensive. Strategically, he thinks the defense of Bakhmut was carried out for too long by Ukrainian forces, for political reasons; materially, he agrees that the West should have got its act together a little sooner to provide more advanced weaponry to the front. But, for him, these are secondary matters: “Most of it came down to the Russian side.” A failure to appreciate this was a major problem in U.S. discussions of the war. Dara Massicot, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told me that the emphasis on Russian incompetence in the first months of the war created unrealistic expectations and complacency. “The narratives that the Russian military is an incompetent clown car, incapable of learning, that they are about to collapse, and so on, are unhelpful and have done real damage,” Massicot said. “They have not collapsed. They’re still there. They have stood in the field and absorbed billions’ worth of Western weapons and aid over two years.”

In early November, the behind-the-scenes disagreements over Russian capabilities broke out into the open, in the form of an extraordinary essay by Zaluzhny and accompanying interview published in The Economist. Zaluzhny admitted that the counter-offensive had stalled and that the war was now in what he called a stalemate. He identified several factors—technological breakthroughs, achieving air superiority, improving electronic-warfare capabilities—that, he hoped, might move the war into a new phase. But Zaluzhny had lost faith in the idea that, by imposing devastating casualties on the invader, he would be able to take them out of the fight: “That was my mistake. Russia has lost at least 150,000 dead. In any other country such casualties would have stopped the war.” Zelensky, in turn, was frustrated that the commander-in-chief was making his views public—worsening an already tense relationship between the two.

Some analysts hope that the upcoming introduction of the American F-16 fighter to the Ukrainian side will change the course of the war. (Most predict that the F-16 will be helpful but not decisive.) Some believe that dropping a requirement that Western weaponry not be used to strike inside Russia could help. (Others, while agreeing, caution that deep strikes cannot be a substitute for conventional warfare; ultimately, Ukraine will have to take back territory in a ground offensive.) Many are concerned about the fact that Oleksandr Syrsky, Zelensky’s new choice for commander-in-chief, is the general who insisted on defending Bakhmut even after it became indefensible; they are even more concerned about the military-assistance package that is being held up in the U.S. Congress. But if, as Zaluzhny told The Economist, there will be no “deep and beautiful breakthrough,” what will happen instead?

The political-science literature on war duration (as opposed to war outcomes) is pretty clear: If a war is not over quickly, then it will last a long time. This is because incentives change. Blood and treasure have been expended. Society has been mobilized, the enemy vilified. People are angry. The war must go on.

There is a wrinkle to this story, however, when it comes to regime types. The standard work is “Democracies at War,” by Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, from 2002. Reiter and Stam argue, based on a slew of examples, that democracies have a better war-fighting record than autocracies. The reason is that they are better at fighting (the soldiers are more motivated) and that they start fewer dumb wars of choice. In a late chapter of the book, however, Reiter and Stam sound a cautionary note. For the same reason that democracies tend to start fewer wars, they tend to grow weary of them faster: “When the promised quick victory does not materialize . . . the people may reconsider their decision to consent to the war at hand and actively withdraw their support.” According to Reiter and Stam, this is the main reason that Harry Truman decided to drop two atomic bombs on Japanese cities in the summer of 1945. When wars drag on, democracies’ chances of victory diminish. In fact, Reiter and Stam write, “The longer a war continues, the more likely autocracies are to win.”

Putin has probably not read Chapter 7 of “Democracies at War,” but he has long been counting on the dynamics it describes. He has what he likes to think of as stability—he can decide on a policy and stick with it—whereas Western democracies are constantly changing their leaders and their minds. It was apparently his calculation, in the run-up to the war, that European voters would not long stand for the high energy prices that a war with Russia would entail; he believed, too, that the U.S. was preoccupied with its own difficulties and would not mount a sustained response. For nearly two years, he was wrong. Western democracies rallied to the side of Ukraine, and Russia seemed a lot less stable than Putin had supposed: a partial mobilization in the fall of 2022 was unpopular, and, in the summer of 2023, one of Putin’s longtime loyal oligarchs, Yevgeny Prigozhin, gathered a column of men and started marching toward Moscow. But Prigozhin was assassinated, and, in recent months, Putin’s expectations of Western disarray have finally begun to be met. Largely owing to Hungarian recalcitrance, the European Union took months to agree on a large aid package to Ukraine; more worrisome still, a group of Republicans has been able to stall a similarly large aid package in the U.S. Congress. And inside Ukraine, too, politics have reappeared. It is widely thought that Zelensky decided to remove Zaluzhny because he worried that Zaluzhny was becoming a political rival. (Zaluzhny’s public disagreements with his boss did not help.)

Hamas’s violent incursion into Israel on October 7th of last year, followed by Israel’s hugely disproportionate response, has scrambled the international map. It has also occupied the time of senior U.S. officials and weakened Joe Biden politically. Then there is this year’s U.S. Presidential election. The fact that, back in 2019, Donald Trump appeared to attempt to extort Zelensky—conditioning military aid on Ukraine’s willingness to investigate the Biden family—is not an encouraging sign for supporters of Ukraine. Neither is Trump’s long-standing skepticism of nato, expressed most recently in his comment that he would encourage Russia “to do whatever the hell they want” to nato countries that did not “pay.”

Most military analysts believe that, in the coming year, even if U.S. aid finally comes through, Russia has the advantage. Russia has used continued revenues from the sale of oil and gas to pay for weapons manufacturing: it’s producing munitions, missiles, and tanks at rates double and triple what they were before the war. Though Ukrainian forces have driven drone innovation on the battlefield, Russia, over the past year, has produced more drones. And the state has managed, by hook and by crook, to continue recruiting men into the armed forces. “Let’s be honest,” Zaluzhny told The Economist, “it’s a feudal state where the cheapest resource is human life.”

Ukraine has some advantages. Western-supplied long-range missile systems possess precision and evasion capabilities that Russian missiles cannot match. These have allowed Ukraine to strike Russian airfields, barracks, and weapons depots well behind the front lines, including in Crimea; they have also helped Ukraine break the blockade of its Black Sea shipping lanes. Ukrainian soldiers have a better sense of what they’re fighting for, and the Army is the most respected institution in the country. Though Zaluzhny has been replaced, there is reason to believe that the reforms he’s been advocating, including a substantial increase in troop mobilization, will be carried out without him.

Military analysts are, however, a little hard-pressed to describe an actual military victory for Ukraine. Boston says he has not heard anyone discussing the equipment and firepower Ukraine would need. “Let’s say I want to have a breakthrough operation against Russian forces,” he said. “I need to have substantial artillery superiority at the point of the attack. I need to find a way to introduce land forces in sufficient numbers and have a way that they will not all get blown up by enemy artillery. The enemy artillery needs to be suppressed, needs to be destroyed, or needs to be blinded so that you can get enough of the land forces to punch the hole.” This needs to happen, furthermore, at multiple points, and Ukraine needs to have forces in reserve so that, if a breakthrough is achieved, those troops can take advantage of it. “That all, to me, sounds remarkably expensive,” Boston said. In a situation where a roughly base level of support is having trouble making it through a divided Congress, Boston found it hard to see a way toward an even greater level.

“Ukraine needs to prepare for a long war,” Olga Oliker, a former rand analyst and Pentagon staffer who is now the head of the Europe and Central Asia program at the International Crisis Group, told me. Oliker believes that a long war could be won, but it may not look like the victory some maximalists have been promising. “You have to create the space for Ukraine to claim victory under less-than-ideal conditions,” she said. “Because, if you say the only thing that is victory is the Russians go home entirely from Crimea and Donbas, Ukraine is in nato, and Moscow somehow disappears off the face of the earth—that’s an unrealistic goal. To me, Ukrainian victory is a situation in which Russia can’t do this again or at least is going to have a very hard time doing it again.”

This could mean that the Russian military is constrained by some agreement that it’s been forced into, but it could also mean that Ukraine’s defenses are sufficiently bolstered, and its allies sufficiently clear in their resolve, that the cost to Russia of a renewed offensive would simply be too high. There is also the hope, not entirely illusory, that Russian vulnerabilities will eventually become too much for the Putin regime to handle. “There’s a certain amount of instability that’s built into the Russian system that the Russians worry about,” Oliker said. “At some point, if they’re worried enough, they might be willing to negotiate.”

A senior Biden Administration official who has helped develop sanctions against Russia expounded on this theory. He said that, for some time, the Administration’s view has been that Russia can continue its current level of war expenditures into the spring of 2025, at which point it will run into trouble. He pointed to the freezing of Russian assets abroad, the running down of its hard-currency reserves, and the increasingly complex supply lines that Russia needs to evade Western sanctions. “It’s like a top that’s slowing down,” the official said. “They’re going to have to start making harder and harder choices, faster and faster, as we get into 2025. That’s a far cry from whatever Putin’s aim was in this war—which was, you know, reinstating Catherine the Great’s empire or something.”

The Administration official was painting an optimistic picture—one that depends on continued Western support. When I asked whether there was a contingency plan if the aid did not come through, he said there wasn’t one: “The contingency plan, frankly, is that the Ukrainians will keep fighting with less and less.” Ukraine is already running short of artillery shells, and it could eventually run out of air-defense interceptors. “So it’s a very stark choice in terms of the security assistance,” the official said. He estimated that, with the help of Western air-defense systems, Ukrainian forces could shoot down as many as ninety per cent of Russian air-attack assets. “Without it, that number will be zero soon.”

There is a third option for how the war might develop, beyond a “mutually hurting stalemate,” as it’s known in the literature, and a measured Ukrainian victory. As Michael Kofman, a longtime analyst of the Russian military who is now at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, stressed to me, Ukraine could start to lose. That could mean a breakthrough by Russian forces, though they have so far been unable to achieve one, or just enough wearing down of Ukrainian and Western will that Ukraine is forced to negotiate concessions from a position of weakness. The question then becomes what, aside from the catastrophic humanitarian and political consequences in Ukraine, a Russian victory would mean for the world. If Putin wins, or feels like he has won, what will he do next?

Some argue that he would do nothing—that Ukraine is a special case, more central to Russia’s conception of itself as an imperial power than any other country. The counter-argument is that we don’t know. “In Moscow, they have all sorts of assessments of nato power,” Massicot said. “I don’t think they can confront it directly. For one thing, the Russian Army is partially destroyed. The Russian Air Force has not exactly covered themselves in glory in this war. But they will downgrade their assessment of nato as a cohesive alliance on the basis of our political will. From their point of view, they will feel that they have won a proxy war with nato. And they’re going to be angry, they’re going to want revenge, and now they think we’re weaker than we are. That’s a dangerous situation.” Right now, the U.S. has about a hundred thousand troops in Europe; in 1989, there were three times that many. An ambiguous result in Ukraine, which leaves Russia capable of further offensive action, could mean a movement toward old troop levels. And Mearsheimer, Posen, and Cohen would have to dust off their essays on nato preparedness.

It feels, in fact, like all the old Cold War arguments are back. Clearly, the Russian leadership is capable of brutal expansionist aggression. But just how far are they willing to go, and what exactly will they think of next? “The problem that I see is that the Russian economy has undergone a structural transition and is now on a militarized footing,” Kofman said. “So the Russian government is probably going to be focussed on regenerating military power for some time, both because it’s a matter of strategy but also because the militarized economy is going to be producing military goods and they will not have an easy way to transition it back.” This, Kofman concluded, means “that they could be in a position sooner than people think to actually contest the security and stability of Europe.”

Kofman, Lee, and Massicot recently published an article on the national-security Web site War on the Rocks in which they outlined a strategy for Ukrainian victory. “Hold, Build, and Strike,” they called it. In the essay, they urged Ukraine to hold the line of contact in the coming months, spend 2024 building up its forces, and then strike, in 2025, when they could see an advantage. These ideas were not far from what Zaluzhny had been advocating over the past several months. “You shouldn’t fight a war till your first failed offensive,” Kofman said. “That’s not how most conventional wars go. If that’s how they went, they’d all be over really fast.” He went on to give an example from the Second World War. “You know Stalin’s famous ten blows?” These were ten major offensives, several of them on Ukrainian territory, that the Soviets undertook against Germany in 1944. But there were, in fact, far more than ten offensives, Kofman said: “They just don’t include all the offensives that failed.” Last summer was a good opportunity for Ukraine to take back territory from the Russian Army, but it will not, Kofman believes, be the last such opportunity.

Oliker, whose job at the International Crisis Group is to seek ways to end conflicts, does not see how this one can end just yet. She admitted that, in the aftermath of the failed counter-offensive, in the midst of a long cold winter, and with Western support in doubt, Ukraine is facing a very difficult moment. “But it was not a good moment for Russia in spring and summer of 2022,” Oliker said. “That’s war. If it is, in fact, a long war, prepare for a few more back-and-forths.”

Source: The New Yorker

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Upon returning from an Arab League-OIC summit, President Erdoğan said Türkiye remains a key actor in resolving regional crises, including the Palestine-Israel conflict, as he pushes for more diplomatic and concrete efforts and criticizes support for ‘baby killer’ Israel

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan joined heads of state at an emergency meeting of the Arab League and the Organisaton for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Saudi Arabia on Saturday. The summit, focusing on the Palestine-Israel conflict, was a highlight in Türkiye’s tireless efforts for a permanent solution to the conflict and a push for an immediate cease-fire.

Speaking to journalists while returning home, Erdoğan stressed that his country was a key actor in resolving regional crises and criticized “baby killer” Israel.

“Palestine, which fights for its very existence in the face of decades of occupation and pressure, is going through an unspeakable oppression for 36 days. Innocent civilians in Gaza lose their lives through indiscriminating heavy bombardment and are forced to leave their lands. Israel, right before the eyes of the world, commits war crimes by targeting hospitals, schools and places of worship without discrimination. They target ambulances carrying patients and the deceased and refugee camps. Western countries also watch this savagery,” he lamented.

Erdoğan said people with a conscience cannot stand silent. “Since day one, I tried to be the voice of the Palestinian cause and make the world see the massacre in Gaza. I am engaged in phone diplomacy and visit other countries to that extent,” he said.

Erdoğan stated that Türkiye has been engaged in diplomacy and dialogue since the beginning of the new stage of the conflict on Oct. 7 to ensure a humanitarian cease-fire and delivered some 230 tons of humanitarian aid to Egypt for delivery to Gaza. He noted that a large Turkish vessel was also on its way to Egypt for more aid.

The Turkish president said the international community needs to take concrete action in the face of massacres. “But once again, we see the United Nations Security Council is dysfunctional,” he said while hailing 121 countries voting yes at the Oct. 27 session of the U.N. General Assembly for a cease-fire and unconditional humanitarian aid delivery.

“I find it valuable that the majority of the international community adopted this approach. To ensure it, the Islamic world should be one voice. I stressed it at Saturday’s summit. I highlighted that the OIC, whose original purpose of foundation was the Palestinian cause, has a great responsibility. I told the summit and my counterparts I met on the sidelines of the summit that any steps would not be lasting unless the Palestinian issue is fully resolved,” he said. He added that the establishment of an independent, sovereign Palestine state with East Jerusalem as its capital was key to permanent peace in the region.

“I noted that everyone should make a contribution to ensure it,” he said.

Erdoğan voiced his appreciation for Egypt under the leadership of President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi for keeping the Rafah border crossing with Gaza open. He said they confirmed plans to remain in touch.

“As Türkiye, we renewed our commitment to a solution and taking responsibility as a guarantor country,” he said.

“We will do what we can do to stop bloodshed, in coordination with our friends in the OIC,” he stated.

Settlers, nuclear threat

Erdoğan acknowledged that the OIC used to limit its action to condemning such crises in the past and states used to abstain from taking steps for various reasons. “But this time, we had a clear picture, and Türkiye’s proposals made it to the joint declaration of the summit. We now have a declaration containing a myriad of actions and things that have not been said before, such as the recognition of (Israeli illegal) settlers as terrorists, a declaration that generated a geostrategy. For the first time, we proposed a nuclear nonproliferation conference, given Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons,” he said.

The declaration “condemned the hateful, extremist and racist acts and statements made by ministers in the Israeli occupation government, including the threat by one of the ministers to use nuclear weapons against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip, being a serious threat to global peace and security, which requires supporting the conference to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, held within the framework of the United Nations and its objectives to confront this threat.”

The issue of denuclearization is very significant in terms of revealing which actors are supporting Israel, Erdoğan told journalists. “Now, it is of great importance that both the OIC and the Arab League came together and took this step (resolution) because this is the first time in the history of the two organizations that such a meeting took place,” he added.

Last Sunday, Israeli Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu, a member of the far-right Otzma Yehudit party, told Israeli media that dropping a “nuclear bomb” on the Gaza Strip was “an option.” Though Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu distanced himself from the statement and, according to media reports, suspended Eliyahu from Cabinet meetings until further notice, Eliyahu’s statement caused an international uproar because it was seen as admitting Tel Aviv possesses nuclear weapons and can use them against any country.

Erdoğan said progress was also made regarding the delivery of aid in the declaration’s final text. “For instance, there was a call for breaking the blockade of Gaza for delivery of aid. Some member states inquired whether all actions mentioned in the declaration would be fulfilled. We told them that we need words to be written first to be followed by action. This declaration will be a reference for any country looking to do something. More importantly, the West will see that our distance from them grows because of their stance on the Palestine issue. (French President Emmanuel) Macron, for instance, has started to change his rhetoric. He visited Israel and voiced his support to them but when he saw that the number of deaths increased and the size of the massacre grew, he started to develop a policy against it,” he said.

“This was not a summit where people convened, talked and went their separate ways. On the contrary, we have a list of actions that will be carried out,” Erdoğan said.

On a question about Türkiye’s road map for a solution to the conflict, Erdoğan said they were working on various aspects, such as convincing the 40 countries that abstained from a vote on an immediate cease-fire at the U.N. General Assembly to vote in favor. “We are planning to concentrate our diplomatic efforts on this matter. For example, Hungary is among the countries that abstained from the vote. We are wondering whether we can persuade them,” he said.

He added that he would be more engaged in phone diplomacy after the summit and would host Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi on Nov. 28. “I believe we can convince countries that supported Ukraine in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. They cannot remain silent about the killings of thousands of people. In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, we did not discriminate against any side and even mediated grain deals to Africa and Europe. Now it is the turn of those countries supporting Ukraine to raise their voice (for Palestine),” he said.

Erdoğan noted that first lady Emine Erdoğan would also host a meeting of first ladies in Türkiye on Nov. 15 on the issue. He said he would visit Germany on Nov. 17 and convey “messages” to the West. “Germany is the most powerful country in Europe and our messages will definitely be heard,” he said.

Erdoğan said he would also visit Algeria and said Algeria was a country with influence in Africa and could pave the way for convincing more African countries to adopt a stance for the resolution of the Palestine-Israel conflict.

He also pointed out that the European Union has failed in the face of Israel’s massacres and lamented the absence of a clear stance against Israel from EU members. “I wonder where Germany stands and will have a chance to see it in my Germany visit,” he said.

“The EU views Hamas as a terrorist group just like Israel did. We don’t view Hamas as such and will never do so. Hamas is a political party. They (the EU) want us to recognize it as a terrorist group. No, they are not. They are people fighting for their lands,” he said.

“All heads of state, including leaders of Muslim countries, marched together in Paris after the Charlie Hebdo incident. But they don’t raise their voice now despite some 13,000 people being killed in Gaza. This is because those who died in Gaza are Muslims. Those killed in Paris were the French,” he said.

“For us, people dying are people, not people of this religion or that religion. Don’t you see children are dying? You see parents kissing their dead children. You see bodies of children lined on the ground before their burial. You see mothers embracing the bodies of their children. These should move your conscience,” he said.

Erdoğan reiterated that everyone knows Türkiye is a key country in the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean and in the wider region. “Making plans despite Türkiye’s objections in this region is impossible. Everybody knows our clear stand, our principles and our values. We work to protect people’s lives, to ensure peace, end conflicts and wipe the tears of the innocent. We have solutions for every conflict and we offer them to anyone willing to listen. Our door is open to anyone valuing our stand. We always talk to anyone contacting us for a sincere solution, and we will continue working to save the dignity of humankind. Türkiye is the only country offering the most applicable solutions,” he said, noting that Türkiye was the only nation with contacts in every country in the region and could bring warring sides to the table in conflicts.

“We have to hold talks with the Gulf countries, with Egypt to exert pressure on the United States so that it can exert pressure on Israel,” he said, noting Gulf countries’ relations with the West can help press Israel to stop the bloodshed.

On comments on whether this will be a “religious” war, a war of the “crescent and cross,” Erdoğan assured that would not be the case. “Because this is a war of good and evil, lies and truth, oppressor and the oppressed,” he said.

“I believe, in the end, the good, people siding with the truth, the oppressed and their defenders, in other words, Palestinians, will win,” he said.

Referring to his confrontation with then-Israeli President Shimon Peres at a Davos summit years ago over Israel’s atrocities toward Palestinians, Erdoğan said that he was continuing to take steps to raise the voice of ignored Palestinians.

Erdoğan famously accused Israel of killing children during a panel where he was sitting next to Peres. “With its latest Gaza attacks, Israel lost international public support. Though their administrations embrace Israel for their imperialist interests, people of most countries view Israel as a country murdering babies,” he said.

Source: Daily Sabah

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