I was at the National Day reception at the Chinese Embassy in Ankara when Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Öncü Keçeli made a statement “it is an internal U.S. matter” regarding the federal corruption charges against New York Mayor Eric Adams in which Türkiye is at the center.
Unlike the Saudi Arabian reception, the entire Turkish military command wasn’t present at the reception, but it was still the most crowded diplomatic event I’ve attended recently. Notably, Treasury and Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek was there, a figure to whom the Chinese likely attach great importance.
Before delving into the BRICS issue, let’s examine why the Chinese placed such importance on Şimşek’s participation, and why Chinese Ambassador to Ankara Liu Shaobin hardly left his side.
Şimşek and Erdoğan: China-bound
High-level regular meetings between Türkiye and China have been on hold since 2016. One reason for this was that the Chinese Communist Party viewed talks with Türkiye at the Deputy Prime Minister level, while Türkiye no longer had such a position after governmental restructuring. In 2018, Erdoğan had given this responsibility to his son-in-law Berat Albayrak by merging the Treasury and Finance ministries. This was followed by a brief period under Lütfü Elvan, and then Nurettin Nebati. However, Beijing didn’t consider these officials equivalent to their Deputy Prime Ministers, so meetings couldn’t be held.
The situation changed after Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to China in July. Diplomatic efforts intensified, and some steps were taken. For example, an independent China desk was created in the Turkish Foreign Ministry, separate from the Asia department. The Chinese finally accepted Mehmet Şimşek as equivalent to a Deputy Prime Minister.
As a result, it’s expected that Xi Jinping will be the first Chinese President to visit Türkiye in 25 years (following Jiang Zemin’s visit during Süleyman Demirel’s presidency) in early 2025. Erdoğan is also expected to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit, anticipated to be held in mid-2025.
The BRICS Question
The Chinese reception brought together diplomats from the East, including Russia as well as West (though I may have missed seeing anyone from the U.S.) from European Union countries and Africa. Despite China being officially labeled as an adversary at the last NATO Summit, it’s evident that many NATO and EU member countries’ commercial interest in China has increased.
Among the Western diplomats I spoke with, few were curious about the corruption scandal in New York. Instead, almost all were wondering if Erdoğan would join BRICS.
I’ll share both the Europeans’ perspective on Türkiye’s potential BRICS membership – which might not please everyone in Türkiye – and address their curiosity through this article.
Latest BRICS Developments
Erdoğan had put attending the BRICS Summit in Kazan on October 22-24 on his agenda before departing for the U.S. for the UN General Assembly. The trip seems to have been confirmed following the news from Turkish Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on September 25, that they discussed having a one-on-one meeting during the Summit. Interestingly, Yuri Ushakov, Putin’s chief advisor, had announced on September 3 that Erdoğan would attend, but Ankara hadn’t confirmed at that time.
The reason for not officially announcing it earlier is intriguing. Recall that U.S. President Joe Biden had invited Erdoğan to the White House after approving Sweden’s NATO membership. It had leaked to the media from Ankara that the visit would likely take place on May 9. However, the White House realized that Erdoğan might use the reception to criticize Israel and its supporter Biden over the Gaza Crisis. They began imposing impractical conditions on Türkiye, such as “let’s not talk to the press.” While discussions were still ongoing, minutes after the outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Ankara Jeff Flake assured that the visit would definitely happen, Erdoğan announced he wouldn’t go.
Now, announcements aren’t made until all confirmations are complete and the last moment arrives. We saw this approach with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s recent visit as well.
Türkiye’s BRICS Application
Although Foreign Ministry sources still won’t provide an exact date, they confirm that Türkiye applied for BRICS membership “about 8-9 months ago,” which would be in the first months of 2024.
In fact, Erdoğan indirectly mentioned the application on September 27 when he told journalists, “Belonging to such an organization (BRICS) doesn’t mean leaving NATO.” This statement is significant as it compares BRICS, which is still organizing itself as an economic group, with NATO, the world’s strongest military-political alliance. European diplomats are particularly interested in this aspect. We’ll explore this in more detail shortly.
Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s statements before the UN General Assembly already indicated that Türkiye views BRICS membership not as “abandoning the West for the East,” but as an opportunity to expand its trade relations.
Fidan told Anadolu Agency on September 19, “If Türkiye were in the EU, it wouldn’t be seeking BRICS.” At SETA on September 20, he elaborated in brief: “We’re looking at the economic opportunities here. Something new is being established, and we don’t want to be left out. It could be BRICS, it could be ASEAN, it could be a trade agreement with the U.S. We evaluate these options based on our trade interests.”
The European Perspective
As is well known, BRICS consists of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. More recently, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates have also joined. On August 19, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev also submitted an official application following his meeting with Putin.
According to a report titled “Expansion of BRICS: A quest for greater global influence?” presented to the European Parliament on March 15, 2024, the original five BRICS countries now account for 37.3 percent of the World economy, while the EU’s share has fallen to 14.5 percent. It’s worth noting that the EU total includes economic powerhouses like Germany, France, and Italy.
It’s no surprise that EU countries, forced to curtail their profitable trade with Russia due to U.S.-led sanctions, are showing increased interest in China.
While no one wants to speak on record about this subject, my strong impression is that the general EU sentiment views Türkiye’s potential BRICS membership not as something to oppose “as long as it doesn’t harm NATO,” but even as potentially beneficial, thinking “having a NATO member in BRICS could be useful.”
BRICS, NATO, and Türkiye
Those who claim “Türkiye will join BRICS and completely break away from the West” seem to forget that India, one of the U.S.’s closest allies in Asia (along with Japan and South Korea) and one of Israel’s closest allies, is a founding member of BRICS. When this point is raised, the typical response is, “But Türkiye is a NATO member” – a sentiment not even echoed by most EU countries. We’ve also seen economist Daron Acemoğlu state in an interview with T24’s Murat Sabuncu that “BRICS is not the right platform” for Türkiye. It appears that most EU countries see Türkiye’s potential BRICS membership as potentially useful, “as long as it doesn’t harm NATO.”
Türkiye’s implication in the New York bribery scandal is unfortunate. As CHP leader Özgür Özel emphasized, the allegation involves bribes given to New York City officials to expedite the opening of the Turkish House – “the property of Türkiye, not of an individual” – for Erdoğan’s 2021 UN work. The Foreign Ministry’s response that “we won’t interfere with U.S. justice” is at least a step to mitigate potential damage.
The anti-Türkiye sentiment in both the Democratic and Republican wings of the U.S. Congress is already so entrenched that this scandal is unlikely to worsen the situation significantly. The Foreign Ministry’s approach of “if any Turkish official has done wrong, they should face justice while retaining their citizenship rights” is unprecedented. This could be attributed to Hakan Fidan’s influence in his role as Foreign Minister.
